EMERGENCY PETITION TO THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REQUESTING TO BE RESCUED FROM EIGHT YEARS AND COUNTING OF KIDNAPPING, FALSE IMPRISONMENT, AND ASSAULT BY THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, AND VIOLATIONS OF RICO AND THE HATE CRIMES ACT.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The jurisdiction of this petition is invoked by 28 U.S.C.A. s 535(a); 18 U.S.C.A. s 1962; 18 U.S.C.A. s 249.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Terron Dizzley, declare under penalties of perjury that the foregoing information is true and

correct.

DATE: 

STATEMENT OF CASE

I, Terron Gerhard Dizzley, am respectfully requesting that the United states Department of Justice, The Office of Office of Professional Responsibility and the Civil Rights Division expeditiously conduct an investigation pursuant to me being kidnapped, falsely imprisoned for eight years and counting by the State of South Carolina, without legal or judicial authority. I am also exercising my right to press criminal charges on each individual that committed and participated in or turned a blind eye to, condoned, or authorized these crimes against me in violation of my civil rights. I am also requesting that this information be provided to the prosecuting attorney of the FBI. The investigation involves the following government officials, entities, and individuals: Investigators of Georgetown County Sheriff’s Department, Melvin Garrett, Dustin Morris and Magistrate Judge, Elaine C. Elliott; Georgetown County Solicitors, Gregory Hembree, Scott Hixon, Erin Bailey; Clerk of Court of Georgetown County, Alma Y. White, Clerk of Court of Richland County, Jeanette W. McBride, United States District Court of South Carolina and The United Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

ARGUMENT 1

GEORGETOWN COUNTY SOLICITORS – GREGORY HEMBREE AND ERIN BAILEY DOUBLE JEOPARDY JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL

False Imprisonment, Double Jeopardy, Lack of Trial Court’s Jurisdiction to Impose

Sentence

Solicitors Gregory Hembree and Erin Bailey did unlawfully and maliciously prosecuted Terron Gerhard Dizzley for a second time in 2014 for the same offense of murder of which he was acquitted in his first trial of 2012 resulting in kidnapping and false imprisonment for over seven, almost eight years and counting. An unlawful conviction in such circumstances, The Supreme Court of the United States has established that any sentence imposed on Terron is without jurisdiction and holds no authority to hold him in prison, and he must be immediately discharged. Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873).

I. The Honorable Judge Baxley’s ruling in Petitioner’s first trial of 2012, stating that his decision to declare a mistrial/hung jury, was not based on a failure on the jury’s part that they could not bring back a unanimous verdict, but that his decision to declare a mistrial was, “a strong message to the prosecution that they are unable to meet their “burden of proof” to the extent that they could bring back a unanimous verdict” was a “judgment of acquittal”, which barred retrial under the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause, and terminated the jurisdiction of Petitioner’s case.

STATEMENT OF CASE

ARGUMENT 1

JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, Trial of 2012

I. The Circuit Court Judge erred in his ruling at the November 17, 2022, hearing that trial judge's ruling at Appellant's first trial of 2012, discharging Appellant's jury on the grounds that the state failed to meet their burden of proof to convict Appellant was not a judgment of acquittal for purposes of double jeopardy which barred Appellant's second trial of 2014 because of the label place on trial court's ruling as a mistrial.

       Appellant contends that the Honorable Judge Culbertson’s order indicates that he merely looked at the “label” of the Honorable Judge Baxley’s ruling of Appellant's first trial of 2012, which indicates that Judge Baxley declared a mistrial/hung jury, and, therefore, determined that such “label” automatically prevents Appellant from exercising his constitutional guarantees under the Fifth Amendment Double Clause. However, according to clearly established United States Supreme Court laws, when evaluating a ruling to determine if it is a judgment of acquittal, for determining whether a decision dismissing a criminal case bars retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause, may not be determined simply by the label, form, caption, or the judge’s characterization of his/her own actions, rather, this determination must be based on the substance of the court’s decision. This determination requires the reviewing court to determine whether the court’s ruling, “whatever it’s label” is based on insufficient evidence to convict. See: Evans v. Michigan, 568 U. S. 313 (2013). “Labels do not control the analysis of whether a decision dismissing a criminal case bars retrial under double jeopardy clause, rather the substance of the court decision does. The U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor, held that midtrial directed verdict and dismissal, based on trial court’s erroneous requirement of an extra element for the charge offence, was “acquittal” for double jeopardy purposes. An acquittal for double jeopardy purposes includes a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, a factual finding that necessarily establishes the criminal culpability, and other rulings which relates to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. Most relevant here, an “acquittal encompasses any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offence.” Quoting U.S. v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).

STATEMENT OF CASE

          The constitutional guarantees of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause which was violated against Appellant in this case is grounded in the United Supreme Court Laws which defines “acquittals” for purposes of double jeopardy. United States Courts Legal Glossary defines Acquittal – “A jury verdict that a criminal defendant is not guilty or the finding of a judge that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction.”

After the State of South Carolina rested its case in Appellant's first trial of 2012, Appellant's trial counsel moved for a directed verdict of not guilty on the grounds that the prosecution failed to present any evidence of the elements of murder, and most importantly, that the prosecution failed to present any evidence that identified Appellant as the person that committed the offense for which he was charged. The Honorable Judge Baxley denied directed verdict, and trial counsel renewed his directed verdict motion after the presentation of Appellant's alibi witnesses. See also: 2012 Transcript ( of Court Reporter, Krystal Smith), P. 66, L. 15 – 17. See: Transcript of 2012 trial ( of Court Reporter Grace Hurley), P. 299, L. 19 – P. 300, L 1 – 4.

In "The Charge on the Law," by the Honorable Judge Baxley, to the jury before closing arguments and deliberations, ( See: Trial Transcript of 2012, Court Reporter, Crystal Smith, Tr. P. 74, L. 8 – 25, citing from 20 – 25). Judge Baxley specifically stated the following: “In this state, according to the Constitution, the prosecution must prove their case to the standard of proof we call beyond a reasonable doubt, which is – that is before a finding of guilt may occur, and if the state failed to meet this high burden and it is a high burden, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal.

On August 30, 2012, after only three to four hours of deliberations, the Honorable Judge Baxley received a note from the jury that they were unable to reach a decision. Judge Baxley then, spontaneously declared a mistrial/hung jury, after stating that it was not a failure on the jury’s part that they could not reach a unanimous decision, but, that this was “a strong message to the prosecution that they are unable to meet the “burden of proof” to the extent that they could bring back a unanimous verdict.”

By deciding that the prosecution failed to meet their burden of proof convict, the Court was clearly saying that Appellate criminal culpability had not been established, which was related to Appellant’s innocence. See: Burks v. United States, 437, U. S. 1 (1978).

Appellant also contends that the Honorable Judge Baxley’s decision to spontaneously declare a mistrial was based on the same reasons that defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of not guilty – because the prosecution failed to meet their burden of proof. See: Transcript of 2012 trial ( by Court Reporter, Grace Hurley). Ruling of the Honorable Judge Michael Baxley., Pages 314, Lines 4 – 18 through Pages 315, Lines 1 – 8. “First of all, I don’t want you to think in any way that your exercise as jurors have been a failure on your part because you could not reach a verdict. That’s not a failure on your part. That really the strength of our system because we bring diverse citizens from different backgrounds from the same community to hear a set of “facts” and make a decision to whether or not in criminal court a person is guilty or innocent.

Now what you’ve told us is that you can’t’ reach a unanimous decision, and I would say to you that that’s not a failure on your part. That’s actually a strong message to the prosecution that they are unable to meet the “burden of proof” to the extent that they can bring back a unanimous verdict.” .

Therefore, according to the Honorable Judge Baxley’s own charge to the jury, that if the state failed to meet their 'burden of proof “to convict Appellant, that he is entitled to an acquittal. Therefore, pursuant to Judge Baxley’s own ruling that the prosecution failed to meet the "burden of proof" to convict Appellant, that ruling was a "judgment of acquittal."

In The South Carolina Supreme Court, it was established in State v. Gregorie, 339 S. C. 2 (2000) that, “On the merits, this issue is “simple”. The Circuit Court found the State failed at trial to meet its “ burden of proof” and ordered a new trial. Petitioner contends, correctly, that under these circumstances, a second trial in magistrate court would violate his Double Jeopardy Rights.” Citing Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1 (1978).

Appellant contends that his case is the same as Gregorie, on the merits, the issue is “simple." In Appellant's first trial of 2012, the Honorable Judge Baxley found that the State failed, at trial, to meet its “burden of proof” and ordered a new trial. Appellant also makes the same argument as Gregorie, that under such circumstances, his second trial of 2014, violated his double jeopardy Rights.

In State v. Rearick, 417 S.C. 391 (2016), "The Court overruled State v. Gregorie, 339 S.C. 2 (2000), and other related decisions in which the Court of Appeals erroneously created an exception to the rule established in Miller that a "criminal defendant claiming a double jeopardy violation is not exempt from regular appealability requirements." Gregorie, 339 S.C. at 4 n. 1, 528 S.E. 2d at 78 n. 1. The Court clarified that the test for appealability is not whether the appeal involves a double jeopardy claim. . . but whether the party bringing the appeal is aggrieved." Id. at 4, 528 S.E. 2d at 78. Applying this rule, the Court found Gregory's appeal was "immediately" appealable not because it involved a double jeopardy claim but because Gregory was otherwise aggrieved by the new trial remedy ordered by the Circuit Court. Id. The Court noted that the Circuit Court for the state failed to meet its "burden of proof" and the State's failure to appeal that finding became the law of the case. Ultimately the Court found Gregory correctly asserted that under the circumstances the second trial in magistrate court would violate his double jeopardy rights. A defendant may still challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds via (1) a petition for federal habeas corpus relief, or (2) a petition for this Court to issue an extraordinary writ."

Appellant contends that, his case is the exact same as Rearick and Gregorie. However, Appellant’s case is more extraordinary because Appellant was also aggrieved by the Honorable Judge Baxley's new trial remedy after discharging his jury on the grounds that the prosecution was unable to meet the "burden of proof" to convict him. However, Appellant suffered, and is still suffering from Judge Baxley's new trial remedy which resulted in going on nine years and counting of being held kidnapped/falsely imprisoned in the South Carolina Department of Corrections without any legal nor jurisdictional authority in violation of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. Therefore, Appellant's case is also "immediately" appealable. See also: Gilliam v. Foster, 63 F.3d 287 (4th Cir. 1995); Livingston v. Murdaugh, 183 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 1999).

  State v. Clifford, 335 S. C. 129 (1999). “Reversing the conviction based on the legal insufficiency of evidence, the matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter a verdict of acquittal. The controlling authority is Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1 (1978), In that case, The Supreme Court ruled “the double jeopardy clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding.” Id., 437 U. S. at 11. Overruling prior decisions to the contrary, the Court held that “The Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient, and the “only” just remedy available for that court is the direction of a judgment of acquittal.”

Appellant contends that his case is also the same as Clifford. The Honorable Judge Baxley, after making a ruling in Appellant's first trial of 2012, that the State failed to meet the “burden of proof” to the extent that they could bring back a unanimous verdict as the grounds for discharging Appellant's jury, the “only” just remedy available according to The United States Supreme Court in Burks, was for the Honorable Judge Baxley to direct a judgment of acquittal, not a new trial to afford the prosecution to another opportunity to attempt to meet their burden of proof. Therefore, the Honorable Judge Baxley’s ruling was an acquittal despite his mistaken understanding of the “only” legal remedy required when the reviewing court has found that the state failed to meet their burden of proof, which is, to enter a verdict of acquittal.

The United States Supreme Court’s precedent cases on judgments of acquittals, establishes that “A mistaken acquittal is an acquittal nonetheless.” See: Fong Foo v. U. S., 369 U. S. 141 (1962); Sanabria v. U. S., 437 U. S. 54 (1978); Evans v. Michigan, 568 U. S. 313 (2013). However, in Appellant's case, it was not a mistaken acquittal, but a mistaken declaration of a mistrial, after the recitation by the Honorable Judge Baxley of the legal standard for an acquittal.

In our Fourth Circuit, it was determined in ” U. S. v Alvarez, 351 F. 3d. 126 (2003 4th

Cir.), “Judgment of Acquittal entered by District Court after jury deadlocked did not implicate double jeopardy clause. In its order, The District Court never expressively stated that it undertook review the sufficiency of the evidence, never recited the standard for an acquittal - “that the evidence was insufficient for any reasonable jury to return a unanimous verdict of guilty." In response to this conclusion, Alvarez and Gonzelez argued that the district court corrected any deficiencies in its judgment of acquittal by recharacterizing the judgment in a later order that denied the government’s motion for detention of the defendants. In the detention order, the district court characterized its earlier judgment of acquittal as holding that “there was insufficient evidence for any reasonable jury to return a unanimous verdict of guilty." If that, in fact, had been the basis for the district court’s judgment of acquittal, we would agree with the defendant that this appeal would be barred. A judgment of acquittal may not be determined simply by the form or caption of the court’s order, The Court of Appeals determines whether the ruling

of the judge whatever its label, actually represents a resolution correct or not, of some or

all of the factual elements of the offense charged.”

          However, in Appellant's case, the Honorable Judge Baxley clearly, expressively stated that he undertook the review of the sufficiency of the evidence, and recited almost word-for-word, (verbatim), what Alvarez has determined is the standard for acquittal, that his decision to declare a mis-trial was not a failure on the part of jury that they could not reach a unanimous verdict, but that his decision to declare a mistrial was a “strong message to the prosecution that they were unable to meet the “burden of proof” to the extent that they could reach a unanimous verdict." Therefore, the Honorable Judge Baxley's characterization of his own action as a mistrial/hung jury does not control the classification of his actions, and accordingly to clearly established federal law, Judge Baxley’s ruling was a judgment of acquittal. See also: Evans v. Michigan, 568 U. S. 313 (2013). “Here we know that trial court acquittal Evans, not because it incanted the word, “acquit” (which it did not) but because it acted on its view that the prosecution had failed to prove its case.” U. S. v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977), “The U.S. Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brennan held that double jeopardy clause barred appeal by U.S. from judgments of acquittal entered under Rule 29 (c) following discharge of jury which had been unable to agree on verdict in criminal contempt trial. Affirmed. What constitutes an “acquittal” for purposes of applications of Double Jeopardy Clause, is not be controlled by the form of the judge’s actions; rather, we must determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever it’s label, represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all the factual elements of the offense charged. The court made only too clear it’s belief that the prosecution was “the weakest (contempt case that) I’ve ever seen.” In entering the judgment of acquittal, the court also recorded its view that “the government has failed to prove the material allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.” Thus, it is plain that the District Court in this case evaluated the Government’s evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction. The Court of Appeals concluded that this determination of insufficiency of evidence triggered double jeopardy protection.” See: Lee v. U.S., 432 U.S 23 (1977). “Questions as to whether double jeopardy clause prohibits retrial after the case has been terminated, after jeopardy has attached, without a finding on the merits does not depend upon whether the court labels its action a dismissal or declaration of “mistrial” but rather whether the order contemplates an end to all prosecution of the defendanydefendant for the offense charged.” Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U. S. 40 (1981), “Double Jeopardy principles precluded re-trial where petitioner moved for a new trial on the grounds that evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict and trial judge granted motion on grounds that State failed to prove its case as a matter of law.”

 According to clearly established United States Supreme Court Law, Judge Baxley’s ruling was an "acquittal." See also Pages 315, L 1 - 8.

 “I don’t want to you believe in any way, zero way, that somehow you are responsible for that, because you are not. You’re given a set of "facts" that were the best that a state could adduce from what happened and what they were able to determine, they put that up to you and you brought back a wise, common-sense decision that you simply could not agree upon it. There is a message in that and so you’ve accomplished your purpose."

 According to the U. S . Supreme Court, South Carolina Supreme Court and Federal Courts, not only was Judge Baxley’s ruling an “acquittal," but such a ruling:

1. Barred retrial under the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. See: Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U. S. 140 (1986); Smith v. Massachusetts, 534 U. S. 462 (2005).

2. Terminated the jurisdiction of Appellant's case and may not be appealed. Exparte Lange, 85 U. S. 163 (1873); U. S. v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82 (1978), “A judgment of a acquittal, whether based on jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict may not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by reversal.”; U. S. v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 95 S. Ct. 1013 (1975), “Constitutional protection against government appeals attaches only where there is a danger of subjecting the defendant to a second trial for the same offence. Provisions of the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 that government could not have a writ of error in any case where there had been a verdict in

favor of the defendant was to assure that the statute would not conflict with the principles of the double jeopardy clause.”

3. A second trial, judgment, and sentence, poses no legal nor jurisdictional authority for the South Carolina Department of Corrections to hold Appellant in prison for the same offense and he “must” be discharged. Exparte Lange, 85 U. S. 163 (1873). “A second judgment of the same verdict is, under such circumstances, void for want of power, and it affords no authority to hold the party a prisoner, and he must be discharged”.

 For the foregoing reasons, according to clearly established United States Supreme Court law, the Honorable Judge Baxley’s ruling in Appellant's first trial of 2012 was an acquittal. Therefore, double jeopardy barred Appellant's retrial of 2014, in which he was unlawfully convicted and sentenced. Therefore, Appellant must be immediately discharged from almost nine years and counting of being held falsely imprisoned.

ARGUMENT 2

JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, NOVEMBER 17, 2022 HEARING

II. The Circuit Court Judge stated an error of law in his ruling at the November 17, 2022 hearing and acquitted Appellant again when he stated that the trial judge’s ruling in Appellant's first trial of 2012, which was a jury trial, discharging Appellant's jury on the grounds that the prosecution failed to meet their burden of proof to convict Appellant was a judgment of acquittal, but judgments of acquittals only applies to bench trials and not jury trials.

STATEMENT OF CASE

       The purpose of the November 17, 2022, hearing in Georgetown, S.C. was for the Honorable Judge Culbertson to determine whether the Honorable Judge Baxley’s ruling in Appellant's first trial of 2012 was an acquittal for purposes of double jeopardy.

Appellant contends that the record shows that at the November 17, 2022, hearing, the Honorable Judge Culbertson admitted that the Honorable Judge Baxley’s ruling in Appellant's first trial 2012 was an acquittal. However, Judge Culbertson, after admitting this, then stated an error of law by saying that it was only an acquittal if Appellant's trial had been a bench trial, and that because Appellant had a jury trial, it was not an acquittal.

See: Transcript of November 17, 2022 Hearing, Tr. P. 5, L. 8 – 25, - P. 6, L. 1 – 6.

8 THE COURT : Let me ask you, and I apologize for

9 interrupting and I'll let you fully argue your motion ,

10 but was this a jury trial?

11 MR. YARBOROUGH : It was.

12 THE COURT : And it resulted in a hung jury?

13 MR YARBOROUGH : Mr. Dizzley, for years, since --

14 since he was retried has filed motions over and over

15 saying, look, you all did not have the authority to

16 try me that second time.

17 THE COURT : I understand that argument, but I'm

18 talking about the first trial. Because the law is

19 clear: If you have a hung jury, the judge declares a

20 mistrial, and then they can try him a second time if

21 it was a hung jury where the jury could not reach a

22 unanimous decision. Now, after a second hung trial,

23 they can't try him a third time.

24 Now, if this was a bench trial and the judge said

25 they have not carried their burden of proof, then I

Page 6, L 1-6.

1 agree with you, double jeopardy. So I'm trying to

2 figure out what happened in that first trial to

3 determine whether or not jeopardy attached. Was the

4 mistrial granted from the finding by the Court, or

5 because the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict

6 of guilt or innocence?

The above ruling by Judge Culbertson is contrary to clearly established United States Supreme Court law. Appellant contends that The United States Supreme Court controlling cases pursuant to “judgments of acquittals” based on “ insufficient evidence to convict," is United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564 (1977), which was a jury trial case. The controlling case on “judgments of acquittals” pursuant to bench trials is Smallis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U. S. 140 (1986), and Smallis supports its decision using Martin and other jury trial cases. See: Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U. S. 140 (1986), “The Supreme Court, Justice White, held that trial judge’s ruling on defendants’ demurrer holding that Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to establish factual guilt was an acquittal under double jeopardy clause and barred Commonwealth’s appeal. Whether the trial is to a jury or, as here, to the bench, subjecting the defendant to post acquittal proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates The Double Jeopardy Clause." U. S. v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82 (1978), “A judgment of an acquittal, whether based on jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict may not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by reversal.” Evans v Michigan, 568 U. S. 313 (2013), “An acquittal, is unreviewable on retrial, under The Double Jeopardy Clause, whether the judge directs the jury to return a verdict of acquittal or foregoes that formality by entering a judgment of acquittal herself.”

 Therefore, according to clearly established United States Supreme law: (1) The Honorable Judge Culbertson’s ruling was an acquittal despite his mistaken understanding of the law that “ judgments acquittals” pursuant to “insufficient evidence” to convict applies to jury trials as well as bench trials. See: Evans v Michigan, 568 U. S. 313 (2013), “ A mistaken acquittal is an acquittal nonetheless, even if the acquittal is “based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation”, Fong Foo v United States, 369 U. S. 141, such as an erroneous decision to exclude evidence, Sanabria v United States, 437 U. S. 54, a mistaken understanding of what evidence would suffice to sustain a conviction, Smith v Massachusetts, 543 U. S. 462; or a “misconstruction of the statue” defining the requirements to convict, Arizona v Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203 (1984).” (2) The Honorable Judge Culbertson’s label that he placed on his ruling of a “denial” of Appellant's Motion for Alteration, Modification, Amend, Reconsideration, Rescission of Order,” do not control the analysis of whether his determination of the Honorable Judge Baxley’s ruling in Appellant's first trial of 2012 was an acquittal, rather, it is substance of the Honorable Judge Culbertson’s ruling that proves that he also acquitted Appellant. See: United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra, 430 U. S. 564 (1977); Evans v. Michigan, supra, 568 U. S. 313 (2013).

For the foregoing reasons, Appellant was acquitted again, by the Honorable Judge Culbertson at Appellant's November 17, 2022, hearing in Georgetown, S.C., despite his error of law and mistaken understanding that judgment of acquittals based on “insufficient evidence” to convict applies to jury trials as well as bench trials and despite the “label” he placed on Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration as a “denial." Therefore, Appellant must be immediately discharged from almost nine years and counting of being held falsely imprisonment.

ARGUMENT 3

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

“MANIFEST NECESSITY OR ENDS OF PUBLIC JUSTICE”

III. The trial judge's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial was not dictated by a manifest necessity or ends of public justice and violated Appellants Fifth Amendment rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

  Appellant contends that the Honorable Judge Culbertson's order also fails to address Appellant's issue that there was no “manifest necessity” for Judge Baxley to declare a mistrial/hung jury. By failing to address this issue also implies that Judge Culbertson relied solely on Judge Baxley’s “label” as a determination that the characterization of Judge Baxley’s own actions is what determines whether double jeopardy bars retrial.

However, this is contrary to clearly established United States Supreme Court law and South Carolina Supreme Court laws. According to clearly established federal law, when a judge declares a mistrial, sua sponte, without defendant’s consent, a “manifest necessity determination” is the appropriate test for determining whether a defendant may be retried without violating double jeopardy principles. See: U. S. v Perez, 22 U. S. 579 (1824), “Mr. Justice STORY delivered the opinion of the Court. In criminal prosecutions, courts have authority to discharge jury from giving any verdict when in their opinion taking all circumstances into consideration there was a manifest necessity for the act or the ends of public justice would be defeated. In discharging jury in criminal prosecutions, courts are to exercise sound discretion, but the power should be used with the greatest caution under urgent circumstances and for very plain and obvious causes; and in capital cases especially, Courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances of life, in favour of the prisoner.” U. S. v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971). See: Washington v. Jarvis, 137 Fed. Appx. 543 (2005 4th Cir.), “Under Supreme Court law, a finding of “manifest necessity” must be based on the totality of the circumstances. United States v Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976). This clearly established standard generally requires an investigation of whether less drastic alternatives to mistrial are available.” State v. Bilton, 156 S. C. 324 (1930), “Discharge of jury without defendant’s consent for reason legally insufficient and without absolute necessity, is equivalent to acquittal, and bars subsequent indictment for same offense."

 Appellant contends that Judge Culbertson’s order does not indicate that he evaluated the record in Appellant's first trial to determine if there was a “manifest necessity” for the Honorable Judge Baxley to declare, sua sponte, a mistrial in Appellant's case.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Appellant contends that the Honorable Judge Baxley’s ruling of “acquittal” resulted from an improvidently granted mistrial /hung jury after only three to four hours of deliberations, portions of that time was consumed by several questions from the jury and time for answering these questions. Judge Baxley, with no consideration to any alternative, without giving any advance warning or notice to the defense counsel nor the court, and without polling the jury, spontaneously declared a mistrial/hung jury. See: Transcript of 2012 by Court Reporter, Crystal Smith, trial pages 116 – 125. See also: Transcript of Court Reporter, Grace Hurley, transcript p. 308, L6 – 316.

On August 29, 2012, at 1:07 p.m., the jury began deliberations. Shortly after deliberations began, the jury sent a message asking to hear the testimonies of Appellant's four alibi witnesses; the judge responded that it would take approximately an hour to set up. At 3:57 p.m., the jury entered the courtroom and listened to the witnesses’ testimonies until 4:52 p.m. and told the could not reach a verdict “that afternoon." At this point, the jury had deliberated only three hours and four minutes before entering the courtroom to listen to the testimonies of the four alibi witnesses. Instead of the trial judge giving an Allen charge and directing the jury to continue deliberations, at 5:26 p.m., the trial judge called the jury back into the courtroom and sent them home early that day, without any consideration as to Appellant's “valued right” under The Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.

The next day, August 30, 2012, jury deliberations continued at 9:42 a.m. However, instead of the jury deliberating, the jury only sent a series of notes to the judge. The first note was received at 10:03 a.m.; and a reply was sent back at 10:21 a.m. Another note was received at 11:12 a.m. that the jury could not reach a verdict, and at 11:25 a.m., the jury enter entered the courtroom, and the judge gave an Allen charge and sent the jury back to continue deliberations. At 12:20 p.m., the jury sent another not indicating that they were still unable to reach a verdict. Trial judge then, spontaneously, in the presence of the jury, with no advance warning or notice to the defense counsel or the court, declared a mistrial, stating that his decision to declare a mistrial was not based on a failure on the on jury’s part to reach a verdict, but that his decision was based on “a strong message to prosecution that they were unable to meet their burden of proof” to the extent that they could bring back a unanimous verdict."

Appellant contends that the record shows that there was no manifest necessity to declare a mistrial after only three to four hours of deliberations. Whereas (1) the trial record reflects that the trial judge, after receiving a second note from the jury, shortly after an Allen charge indicating that they were unable to agree, did not inquire whether more time would help facilitate unanimity or whether more deliberations would be beneficial to the jury. (2) The trial record does not reflect that there exists a significant risk that a verdict may have resulted from pressures inherent in the situation rather than the considered judgment of all the jurors, which would suggest; “a genuinely deadlocked” jury; (3) the trial record does not reflect that the trial judge delicately balanced Appellant’s “valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.”

In State v. Prince, 279 S.C. 30 (1983), the Supreme Court held that where jury had been deliberating only from approximately 4:30 in the afternoon until 10 o'clock at night, a portion of that time consumed by evening meals, mistrial was ordered over defendant’s objections after jury request testimony of two witnesses to be read and court reporter indicated that the testimony would take approximately two hours and 10 minutes was not dictated by manifest necessity or ends of public justice, and therefore retrial of the defendant was barred by double jeopardy. Reversed. Citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); State v. Rowlands, 343 S.C. 454 (2000), “Double Jeopardy Clause barred prosecution for DUI after an improvidently granted mistrial; state moved for a mistrial, after jury was sworn, on ground that one of his material witnesses was missing, which amounted to a “failure of proof”, and, therefore, the trial court granted mistrial was not dictated by manifest necessity or ends of public justice.”

In State v. Robinson, 360 S. C. 187 (2004), It was ruled that there was a manifest necessity for declaration of mistrial where: “record indicated that deliberations for a two-day criminal trial lasted an entire day, that upon receiving notification of jury deadlock, trial judge administered an Allen charge, and that when judge received further notice of deadlock, he inquired whether more time would help facilitate unanimity and jury responded with unequivocal answer that additional time would not break the deadlock. At the second indication of deadlock, courts typically inquire as to whether more deliberations would be beneficial to the jury, and the issue of consent is determined from the jury’s response.”

However, Appellant's case is distinguished from Robinson. In Appellant's case the Honorable Judge Baxley did not inquire as to whether more time would help facilitate unanimity although the jury had deliberated for such a short amount of time.

Appellant also contends that the trial record does not indicate any unwillingness on the part of the jury to deliberate further. See: Buff v. S. C. Dep’t. of Transp. 342 S. C. 416 (2000), “When a jury has twice indicated it is deadlocked, the judge should diplomatically discuss with the jury whether further deliberations could be beneficial. The jury’s consent to resume or to discontinue deliberations is determined either expressly or impliedly, by its response to the trial judge’s comments.” In State v. Rowell, 75 S. C. 494, the jury twice stated that it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. The trial court sent the jury back to deliberate for a third time; it did not inform the jury its consent was necessary in order to pursue further deliberations. The Court held that there was no abuse of discretion in returning the jury to deliberate a third time where there was no indication of unwillingness on the part of the jury to retire. See also: State v. Drakeford, 120 S. C. 400 (1922); Edwards v. Edwards, 342 S. C. 416 (2000).

Appellant contends that based on the totality of the circumstances of his case and clearly established law, the Honorable Judge Baxley could have considered the alternative of inquiring to the jury whether more time would help facilitate unanimity, especially after such short deliberations and the fact that he allowed the jury to go home early the day before for no sufficient reason. Instead of considering any other alternatives, the record shows that the Honorable Judge Baxley, after receiving a second note from the jury foreman that the jury could not reach a verdict, called the jury in the courtroom and abruptly declared a mistrial in the presence of the jury without notifying counsel nor the prosecution. See: U.S. v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971), “In finding a lack of manifest necessity, the plurality stressed that the trial judge gave absolutely “no consideration” to the alternative of trial continuance, and “indeed, acted so abruptly discharging jury” that the parties were given no opportunity to suggest the alternative of continuance or to object in advance to the discharge of the jury. The plurality concluded that where trial judge simply “made no effort to exercise sound discretion to assure that there was a manifest necessity for the sua sponte declaration of a mistrial, a re-prosecution would violate the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment.” Downum v. U.S., 372 U.S.734 (1963); See also: U. S. v. Horn, 583 f. 2d 1124 (1978 10th Cir.),“ The Court of Appeals, held that although the jury foreman the night before, after three to four hours of deliberations, had sent a note that the jury was deadlock, as a result of which the court on the following morning gave an Allen charge, there was no “manifest necessity” for the court, acting sua sponte after somewhat more than one hour’s further deliberations to declare a mistrial without inquiry of jurors at such time as to whether they had made progress or expected to reach a verdict and jeopardy attached by reason of such erroneous declaration of mistrial.” U. S. ex. rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 516 F. 2d. 1034 (1975 3rd Cir.), “Constitutional Double Jeopardy considerations precluded trial of the defendant for a third time on same charges where, after initial prosecution had resulted in hung jury, trial judge in second prosecution, after six and one-half hours of jury deliberations, raised issue of jury deadlock sua sponte and declared a mistrial because of hung jury after having interrogated only jury foreman as to state of jury’s deliberations.” U. S. ex. rel. Russo v. Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, 483 F. 2d 7 (1973 3rd Cir. ), “The Court of Appeals held that there was not manifest necessity to declare a mistrial after only 15 hours of deliberations on grounds that jury was too exhausted to reach an impartial verdict. Defense counsel’s failure to object to declarations of mistrial while jury was in the box after being recalled by court rather than in judge’s chambers after jury had been dismissed, did not prejudice right to challenge subsequent retrial as placing defendant in double jeopardy where defense counsel had no advance warning or notice that mistrial was to be declared and to have objected in front of the jury, might have prejudice the defendant for trying to “show up,” the trial judge, who granted mistrial on ground that jury was exhausted, especially if some members of the jury actually did want to go home despite their civil obligation.” See also: U.S. v. Razmilovic, 507 F. 3d 130 (2007 2nd Cir.), “This case at hand calls on us to review such a ruling to determine whether it was an abuse of discretion for a trial court to decide that a single note indicating deadlock created “manifest necessity” to declare a mistrial. On the record before us, we conclude that it was. We therefore hold that retrial of defendants- appellants Michael DeGennaro and Frank Borghese would violate double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. We also must decide whether Borghese consented to the mistrial but then almost immediately changed his position. We find that Borghese did not deliberately forego his right to have his guilt determined by his original tribunal. The Court of Appeals Circuit Judge Katzmann held that (1) there was no manifest necessity to declare mistrial and (2) defendant did not move for or consent to mistrial. Reversed and Remanded.” United States v. Gordy, 526 F. 2d 631, 636-37 (5th Cir. 1976), ”Finding that the record was insufficient to determine that “no verdict could be reached,” despite statement by foreman that jury was “hung” because no dialogue “was developed with the jurors individually,” and it could not be said with certainty that further deliberations “would have proved futile.”

 Appellant contends that the record shows that Judge Baxley’s dua sponte decision to declare a mistrial was not dictated by a "manifest necessity or ends of public justice" which violated his “valued right’ to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. Because jeopardy attached when the jury was sworn in, Appellant's second trial was barred by the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. See: Arizona v. Washington, 434 U. S. 497 (1978),“Because jeopardy attaches before the judgment becomes final, the constitutional protection also embraces the defendant’s “valued right” to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. The reasons why this “valued right” merits constitutional protection are worthy of repetition. Even if the first trial is not completed, a second prosecution may be grossly unfair. It increases the financial and emotional burden on the accused, prolong the period in which he is stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing, and may even enhance the risk that an innocent defendant may be convicted. The danger of such unfairness to the defendant exists whenever a trial is aborted before it is completed. Consequently, as a general rule, the prosecution is entitled to one and, only one, opportunity to require an accused to stand trial.” Crist v. Bretz, 437 U. S. 28 (1978).

For the foregoing reasons, the Honorable Judge Baxley‘s sua sponte declaration of a mistrial/hung jury, in Appellant's first trial of 2012, was not dictated by a manifest necessity or ends of public justice, and therefore, Appellant's second trial of 2014 was barred by double jeopardy.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Appellant contends that according to United States Supreme Court Law, the moment that the Honorable Judge Baxley made his ruling that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof to the extent that they could bring back a unanimous verdict, and then discharged his jury, the jurisdiction terminated upon his case. See: U. S. v. Scott, supra, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); U. S. v. Wilson, supra, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).

According to United States Supreme Court Law, the moment that the Georgetown County Solicitor’s Office made a conscious decision to try Appellant again for the same offense and sentenced him to imprisonment without jurisdiction, Appellant's case became a criminal matter on behalf of The Georgetown County Solicitor’s Office for false imprisonment, and anyone who participated in Appellant's unlawful incarceration became “trespassers of the law.” Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U. S. 65, (1857), “Where the Court has no jurisdiction or disregards rules of procedure for its exercise, all parties to illegal trials and imprisonment are trespassers on party aggrieved thereby, and he may recover in proper suit in civil courts.” Exparte Lange, 85 U. S. 163 (1873), “The Court initiated what has been described as a long process of expansion of the concept of the lack of jurisdiction. Lange contended that he had been twice sentence for the same offence, in violating the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, when he had been re-sentenced to a term of imprisonment after having paid the fine originally imposed. Carefully disclaiming the use of habeas, as a writ of error, the Supreme Court ordered Lange released from imprisonment because the lower Court's jurisdiction terminated upon the satisfaction of the original sentence. A second judgment of the same verdict is, under such circumstances, void for want of power, and it affords no authority to hold the party a prisoner and must be discharged.”

Whirl v. Kern, 407 F. 2d 781 (1968), “On November 4, 1962, the indictment pending against Whirl were dismissed by nolle prosequi on the grounds that the evidence against Whirl was “insufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction.” Despite the dismissal, “Whirl languished in jail for almost nine months after all charges against him were dismissed and was not restored to his freedom until July 25, 1963. The central issue in this case is one of privilege, not of fact. The tort of false imprisonment is an intentional tort. It is committed when a man intentionally deprives another of his liberty without the other’s consent and without adequate legal justification. Failure to know of a court proceeding terminating all charges against one held in custody is not, as a matter of law, adequate legal justification for an unauthorized restraint. Were the law otherwise, Whirls’ nine months could easily be nine years, and those nine years, ninety-nine years, and still as a matter of law no redress would follow. The law does not hold the value of a man’s freedom in such low regard.”

For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's second trial of 2014 was barred by the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. Therefore, Appellant must be immediately released from being held falsely imprisoned for almost nine years and counting.

STATE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS

S.C. Code 1976 ₴ 16-3-910, “Kidnapping”. See Also, 16-3-920, “ Conspiracy to Kidnap”, which is also defined as “false imprisonment: See State v. Berntsen, 295 S. C. 51 (1988); S.C. Constitution, Art. I, ₴ 12, “Double Jeopardy”; ₴ 3, “Privileges and Immunities”.

FEDERAL STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS

Amend. 5, U. S. Const. “Double Jeopardy”; Amend. 14 U. S. Const., “Due Process, Equal Protection of Laws”; Amend. 13 U. S. Const., “Right to Be Free from Slavery”; 18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1201, “Kidnapping”; 18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 241, (Conspiracy Against Rights); 242, (Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law); 42 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1985, “Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights”;₴1986“Action for Neglect to Prevent; ₴ 1988, ‘Proceeds and Vindication of Civil Rights.

STATE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS

S.C. Code 1976 ₴ 16-3-910, “Kidnapping”. See Also, 16-3-920, “ Conspiracy to Kidnap”, which is also defined as “false imprisonment: See State v. Berntsen, 295 S. C. 51 (1988); S.C. Constitution, Art. I, ₴ 11, “Indictment”; ₴ 3, “Privileges and Immunities”.

FEDERAL STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS

Amend. 5, U. S. Const. “Indictment”; Amend. 14 U. S. Const., “Due Process, Equal Protection of Laws”; Amend. 13 U. S. Const., “Right to Be Free From Slavery”; 18 U.S.C.A. ₴1201, “Kidnapping”; 18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 241, (Conspiracy Against Rights); 242, (Deprivation of R i g h t s Under Color of Law); 42 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1985, “Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights”; ₴ 1986 “Action for Neglect to Prevent; ₴ 1988, ‘Proceeds and Vindication of Civil Rights.

ARGUMENT 4

ARREST WARRANT, FALSE IMPRISONMENT, FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION

IV. The affidavit in Appellant's arrest warrant provided by arresting officer, Investigator, Melvin Garrett, which does not provide any information to enable a magistrate to determine probable cause, and made false declarations to the magistrate to obtain Appellant's arrest warrant result in a constitutionally deficient arrest warrant which violated Appellant's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, resulted in an unlawful seizure, false imprisonment, and tainted the entire judicial process, and resulted in an unlawful prosecution and conviction without jurisdiction. Appellant contends that the Honorable Judge Culbertson’s order fails to address this issue.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Appellant contends that according to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and The S.C. Const. Art. 1, ₴ 10, the only variable that separates the crime of kidnapping from a lawful arrest is “probable cause”.

Appellant contends that, from day one of his unlawful imprisonment he was kidnapped by the Georgetown County Sheriff Department pursuant to an invalid arrest warrant, without probable cause, of which Appellant turned himself in under and claimed his innocence, however, not knowing that his arrest was unlawful.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” See also: The S.C. Const. Art. 1, ₴ 10. See: S C. Code ₴ 16 -3–910, Kidnapping. “The crime of false imprisonment has been incorporated into ₴ 16–3–910 as one method of proving kidnapping. State v. Berntsen, 295 S.C. 52 (1988).”

    On December 11, 2008, Investigator Melvin Garrett of the Georgetown, South Carolina Police Department applied for an arrest warrant for Appellant, Terron Gerhard Dizzley, for murder without probable cause and prepared an affidavit in the arrest warrant that does not provide any information at all that would enable a magistrate judge to determine probable cause. Thus, according to the Fourth Amendment, Appellant's arrest warrant is constitutionally deficient. After hiring a Private Investigator, Bennie L. Webb, it was also found that Investigator Garrett made “false declarations” to the magistrate to obtain Appellant's arrest warrant. See: Exhibits.

  Appellant contends that an evaluation of his arrest warrant’s affidavit, compared to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment of The United States Constitution, and The S.C. Const. Art. 1, ₴ 10, and clearly established law proves that his arrest warrant is constitutionally deficient. Whereas, Appellant's arrest warrant only recites no more than elements of the crime charged, and only states that, Appellant allegedly committed the crime charged, without any personal knowledge of the complaining officer, Investigator Garrett.

 In State v. Smith, 301 S.C. 371 (1990), “The Supreme Court, held that the affidavit submitted to the magistrate in support of a search warrant application contained no facts for which the magistrate could determine why the police officers believed that defendant robbed a motel.”

ARREST WARRANT AFFIDAVIT IN STATE V SMITH

 “That on May 12, at approximately 12:45 p.m. Reginald Jerome Smith went into The Master Inn located at 1468 Savannah Hwy., Charleston, S.C. and he then robbed the manager at knife point. Smith had been staying at The Host of America Room 216 since Jan. 1, 1988, and there is every reason to believe the weapon and clothes used in the robbery will be located in the room. This information was confirmed in person by Sgt. Sherman on 05/13/88.”

 Appellant contends that The United States Supreme Court in Giordenello v. U. S., 357 U.S. 480 (1958), determined that Giordenello's affidavit in his arrest warrant was constutionally deficient.

ARREST WARRANT AFFADAVIT IN GIORDENELLO v. U.S.

 “The undersigned complainant (Finley) being duly sworn state: That on or about January 26, 1956, at Huston, Texas in the Southern District of Texas, Veto Giordenello did receive, conceal, etc. narcotic drugs, to – wit: heroin, hydrochloride with knowledge of unlawful impartation; in violation of Section 174, Title 21, U. S. Code.”

 See: Giordenello v. U. S., 357 U. S. 480 (1958), “Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, complaint merely charging the concealment of heroin without knowledge of it’s illegal impartation in violation of designated statute and containing no affirmative allegations that the complaining officer spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein and not indicating any sources for the officer’s belief and not setting fourth any other sufficient bases upon which a finding of probable cause could be made and did not authorize U.S. Commissioner to issue a warrant for arrest of defendant, and the deficiencies could not be cured by Commissioner’s reliance upon a presumption that the complaint was made on personal knowledge of complaining officer. The Commissioner should not accept without question the complainant’s mere conclusion that the person whose arrest they sought had committed the crime.”

 See: Arrest Warrant of Terron Dizzley. Appellant contends that a comparison of his affidavit in his arrest warrant with the affidavit in the arrest warrant in Smith and Giordenello proves that they are identical and provide no sufficient basis for which a finding of probable cause could be made.

ARREST WARRANT AFFIDAVIT OF TERRON GERHARD DIZZLEY

 “That on or about December 1, 2008, at approximately 10:30 p.m. at 899 Oakland Road in the County of Georgetown, while at the Paradise Club/First and Ten Sports Barr, one Terron Gerhard Dizzley did, with malice and forethought cause the death of Aundry Evans, Jr. by shooting him about the body multiple times with a handgun. This being against the peace and dignity of The State of South Carolina and a violation of South Carolina Code of Law 16-03-0010.

12080088 / Inv. M. Garrett / Inv. D. Morris”.

          Therefore, The South Carolina Supreme Court and The United States Supreme Court have determined that such affidavit as in Appellant's arrest warrant is constitutionally deficient under The Fourth Amendment, which results in an unlawful seizure, false imprisonment and unlawful pre-trial detainment. State v. McKnight, 291 S.C. 110(187), (1) “Search warrant was defective as a result of officers’ failure to comply with affidavit requirement in warrant statute; (2) suppression was appropriate remedy for failure to comply with warrant statute; and (3) all defendants of whom State sought to admit evidence had standing to challenge legality of search under warrant statute.” See: Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 239 (1983); Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Pen., 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

FALSE DECLARATIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE

Appellant contends that the truth, which was also omitted from the affidavit is that the entire investigation of his case rested solely on an alleged hearsay statement by victim that “D” or “Little D” was the person who shot him. Witnesses who alleged that the victim made this statement indicated that he never stated to them who this “D” or “Litttle D” was, no description, or whether this individual is white, black, Hispanic, male , female, etc., and the witnesses indicated that the individual had on a mask and could not be identified.

 Appellant contends that he hired a Private Investigator, Bennie L. Webb, to investigate his arrest warrant. According to Bennie L. Webb’s Investigative report, on April 26, 2018, he spoke to Investigator Garrett and Investigator Garrett informed Investigator Webb that he told the magistrate that he had statements from Naomi Alston and Aundry Evans, Sr. that victim told them that “Terron Dizzley” shot him. However, such statements do not exist, and Investigator Garrett admitted this, in Appellant's second trial of 2014. Therefore, Investigator Garrett intentionally made “false declarations” to the magistrate, which was used to obtain Appellant's arrest warrant, without providing any information in the arrest warrant’s affidavit which would establish probable cause. See: exhibits

See: Exhibit 1. Aundry Evans, Sr.; Investigative Report of Investigator Nelson on December 1, 2008 at 11:20 p.m. at the hospital in Georgetown, S. C. “When asked who shot him, the victim responded he was speaking with his father and did not wish to speak with me. When asked again, victim stated someone just came in and shot him and asked me to leave …. Victim's father then exited the room. I inquired if his son had disclosed any information to him, to which Mr. Evans, Sr. stated “ he had not."

 See: Exhibit 3. However, the next day, Aundry Evans,Sr. gives another statement. December 2, 2008, 0500, “Aundry, Sr. stated that his son had informed him in the Georgetown Hospital that “Little D” was the individual who shot him. Mr. Evans, Sr. did not know who “Little D” was."

The totality of the circumstances of Aundry Evans, Sr.’s statements proves that: (1) None of Mr. Evans, Sr. statements stated that his son told him that "Terron Dizzley" shot him. (2) Evans, Sr. gave two statements that are inconsistent as to material points; (3) Aundry Evans, Sr.’s statements clearly reveals that if his son (victim) did make the statement “Little D” shot him, he never indicated who this “Little D” was. Whereas, the incident report states that: “Mr. Evans, Sr. did not know who “Little D” was.”

See: Exhibit 2. Naomi Alston: Investigator Nelson’s Incident Report, 12-1-2008. 11:20 p.m., second Page, “I responded to the ER where I attempted to speak to the victim, and he would not cooperate and would not provide any information…. I then went to the waiting room where the victim’s fiancé,’ Naomi Alston, provided me with the victim’s information and also stated the victim told her that the male that shot him was called “Little D.” Alston stated that "she believed” the suspect’s name was Tyron Dibsly, but “she knew” he was called “Little D.”

See also: Trial, 2012, Tr. P. 98, L25 – P. 99, L1 – 2.

25. Q. Did he talk about the identity of the shooter at all

1. in the hospital to you?

2. A. He didn't.

Investigator Garrett, Trial of 2014, P. 550, L6 – 15

6. Q. And in terms of why, you were, you were trying to find

7. Terron Dizzley. You had, you had already heard, at least,

8. that Naomi Alston claimed that Terron Dizzley, that he

9. identified Terron Dizzley as the person that shot him? You

10. knew that; right?

11. A. No. What I heard was that he identified a person by the

12. name of “Little D” that shot him.

13. Q. Well, “Little D” , but then you said “Little D” you

14. wanted someone to confirm that “Little D” was Terron Dizzley?

15. A. That’s correct.

    See also: Trial of 2014, Tr.P. 544, L1 – 21 specially P. 545, L19 – 21.

            19. A. “After identifying who

             20. “we thought”, was Little D. of course, we went to try to track

             21. him down and speak with him.

Investigator Nelson, (2014, Tr. P. 482, L6 – P. 483, L1 – 4); Investigator Nelson testified in Appellant's trial that he asked Aundry Evans, Jr. several times at the hospital on the night of December 1, 2008 did he know who shot him and Aundry would not provide any information.

Officer Jarred Bardon, (2014, Tr. P. 463, L18 – 20)

18. Q. Yeah. Did the victim make any statements to you

19. regarding who he thought shot him?

20. A. “He did not.”

 Appellant contends that had Investigator, Melvin Garrett, provided the truth to the magistrate, that his entire investigation rested solely on a "vague" nickname(s), “D” and “Little D,” which did not identify anyone, pursuant to an alleged “hearsay statement,” then such an arrest warrant would have been considered as a “John Doe” warrant, therefore, would still be constitutionally deficient. U.S. v. Doe, 703 F. 2d. 745 (1983, 3rd Cir.), “Describing its subject as “John Doe, a/k/a Ed” was constitutionally insufficient and that insufficiency was not cured by fact that law enforcement agency who executed warrant had independent knowledge that defendant was person for whom warrant was intended. The “John Doe Warrant” in this case does not reduce to a tolerable level the number of potential subjects: anyone with the first name, "Ed" – and, there, must be thousands of "Ed" in the Pittsburg area – is fair game.” See: West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78 (1894), "A warrant for the arrest of James West without other description of the person intended, give no authority to arrest a person whose name is V. M. West or Vandy West, and who have never been known as James West; and it is immaterial that such person was the one the commissioner had in mind he issued the warrant.”

The omission of this truth was misleading and its inclusion and circumstances surrounding these witnesses’ statements would have defeated probable cause. Whereas, Appellant has never gone by the nicknames “D” nor “Little D," and there must be thousands of individuals with the nickname “D.” See: State v. Jones, 331 S.C. 228 (1998), “(1) The search warrant affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause without affiant’s false statement that a confidential informant was an “agent”, and (2) although truthful oral information may substitute for false information in a search warrant affidavit, it may not do so if the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or recklessly, provides false information in the initial search warrant affidavit.”

Appellant contends that because his arrest warrant’s affidavit does not state any probable cause at all, there is nothing for the court to consider as any remaining content of the affidavit to determine if it is still sufficient to establish probable cause. See: Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); Therefore, Appellant's arrest is constitutionally deficient held no legal nor jurisdictional authority for the Georgetown County Sheriff's Department to arrest Appellant which is kidnapping.

JURISDICTION, ARREST WARRANT, INDICTMENT

 Appellant contends that the entire process that led up to his “alleged” indictment is not only illegal and without jurisdiction but was based on information that was fabricated by the Georgetown County Sherriff’s Department and the Georgetown County Solicitor’s Office.

 Appellant contends that in affecting his unlawful arrest and detention pursuant to an unlawful arrest warrant in which the affidavit did not conform to the requirement of the Fourth Amendment of The United States Constitution and The South Carolina Constitution, Art. 1 ₴ 10, and was obtained by knowingly making false declarations to the magistrate, resulted in kidnapping and an unlawful deprivation of Appellant’s liberty without legal nor jurisdictional authority pursuant to an arrest warrant that was “null and void.” State v. Jones, 331 S.C. 228, (1998), citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1998), “Where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, The Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of evidence and with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, a search warrant must be “void and the fruits of the searched excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.” See: State v. Dunbar, 361 S.C. 240 (2004), “ The Fourth Amendment requires that magistrates be impartial and severed from and disengaged from the activities of law enforcement such as that independent determination is not distorted in issuing a search warrant; In reviewing an application for a search warrant, a magistrate must make an independent determination of probable cause and not serve as a rubber stamp for police; A magistrate must not wholly abandon his or her judicial function and essentially perform a police function in issuing a search warrant.” Lo-Ji Sales, Inc., v. York, 442 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1979), “Holding that judge who issued a search abandoned his judicial function and was not neutral and detached when he led police in search.”

 Appellant contends that according to Dunbar, the magistrate, by issuing an arrest warrant without probable cause, abandoned her judicial function as a neutral and detached magistrate and essentially performed a police function and merely served as a rubber stamp for The Georgetown County Sherriff’s Department. Therefore, Appellant's arrest warrant was invalid, and The Georgetown County Sheriff’s Department had no legal nor jurisdictional authority to deprive Appellant of his liberty.

 Appellant contends that the magistrate, at his preliminary hearing, which is the reviewing court, by simply looking at Appellant's arrest warrant’s affidavit, knew that the arrest warrant was invalid, and “void,” and that Appellant was being held unlawfully. See : State v. Weston, 329 U.S. 287 (1997), " The duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed." Therefore, the magistrate had no jurisdictional nor legal authority to conduct a preliminary hearing (Note: Appellant is literally being held kidnapped at the preliminary hearing) and, should have ordered that Appellant be immediately released from being held unlawfully. Instead, the magistrate, at Appellant's preliminary hearing, unlawfully and without jurisdiction bound Appellant's case over to criminal court despite the fact that Appellant was being held unlawfully. Appellant contends that Dunbar also applies to the magistrate at his preliminary hearing, who is also supposed to be neutral and detached. Therefore, by bounding Appellant's case over to criminal court knowing that Appellant was being held unlawfully pursuant to an invalid arrest warrant, also abandoned her judicial function as a neutral and detached magistrate and essentially performed a prosecutorial function by serving merely as a rubber stamp for the prosecution.

 In State v. Funderburk, 259 S.C. 256 (1972), The South Carolina Supreme Court established that: “Where demand for a preliminary hearing following arrest on two warrants issued by magistrate charging offenses of grand larceny and receiving stolen goods, was made ten days before convening of next term of Court of General Sessions but such hearing was not held until after indictment was submitted to grand jury and true bill returned, the Court was without jurisdiction and, the jurisdiction of the grand jury being coextensive with the criminal jurisdiction of the Court, the indictment was a “nulity” and conviction was required to be vacated. Code 1962, ₴ 43-232; Const. Art. 1, ₴ 11. Acts of a court with respect to a matter as to which it has no jurisdiction is “void”. See: Carter v Bryant, 429 S.C. 298 (2020), “Drawing on Frank v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), a facially valid warrant or other facially sufficiently legal process ( be it a preliminary hearing ruling or even a grand jury indictment) does not cut off a person Fourth Amendment Right if the process has been so tainted that “the result is that probable cause is lacking.”

 Therefore, the magistrate at Appellant's preliminary hearing had no legal nor jurisdictional authority to issue an order to bound Appellant's case over to criminal court pursuant to an invalid "void" arrest warrant. Therefore, such order was “ null and void," and because the grand jury is coextensive with the criminal jurisdiction of the Court, the Georgetown County Solicitor's Office had no jurisdiction to indict Appellant pursuant to such order. Therefore, according to South Carolina law, Appellant's indictment is also “null and void," and Appellant's unlawful conviction must be vacated.

 Appellant contends that this argument does not fall within the scope of State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93 (2005). Whereas, Appellant is not challenging The Court of General Sessions jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate a criminal case, but Appellant is challenging The Georgetown County Court of General Sessions jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate a criminal case pursuant to an invalid indictment which is according to clearly established law, "null and void,” which resulted from an alleged grand jury proceeding that was “not legally” constituted. Costello v. U. S. 350 U.S. 363 (1956), “Indictment returned by a “legally” constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the Prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more.”

PERJURY BEFORE ALLEGED GRAND JURY

 Appellant contends that The Georgetown County Solicitor’s Office, by simply looking at his arrest warrant affidavit also knew that the entire process leading up to Appellant's “alleged” grand jury proceedings was not only illegal and without jurisdiction but was based on information that was fabricated by The Georgetown County Sherriff’s Department pursuant an unlawful arrest warrant. Yet, and still, The Georgetown County Solicitor’s Office unlawfully prosecuted Appellant without legal nor jurisdictional authority.

           Appellant contends that the face of his indictment specifically makes reference to his arrest warrant, which according to S.C. Const., Art. 1 ₴ 10 and The Fourth Amendment of The U.S. Constitution, is constitutionally deficient, “void,” and, therefore, a false document. Appellant contends that on the face of his indictment, also indicates that The Georgetown County Sherriff Department was the only witness that testified at his “alleged” grand jury, which was the same sheriff department that provided the deficient affidavit in his arrest warrant and made false declarations to the magistrate to obtain his arrest warrant which led to Appellant's unlawful arrest. Appellant contends that this proves that The Georgetown County Solicitor’s Office knowingly committed perjury by using a false document, which is Appellant's arrest warrant, which was material to the decision-making body as the only evidence, along with the testimony of The Georgetown Sheriff’s Department, to present false evidence at Appellant's alleged grand jury. Appellant contends that the conduct of The Georgetown County Solicitor’s Office violated The South Carolina statute for perjury: See: S.C. Code ₴ 16-9-10, which provides that: A. (1) “It is unlawful for a person to willfully give misleading, incomplete testimony under oath in any court or record, judicial, administrative, or regulatory proceeding in this state; (2) It is unlawful for a person to willfully give false, misleading, or incomplete information on a document, record, report, or form required by the laws of this state.”

 State v. Harrison, 432 S.C. 448 (2021) “Solicitor’s unauthorized exercise of authority by investigating defendant for his involvement in illegal official conduct, where his authority was limited to investigation of legislators did not nullify indictment on charge against defendant for perjury based on false testimony before a grand jury. Citing United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 68, (1951); State v. Byrd, 28 S.C. 18, 21-22 (1888); People v. Skibinoki, 55 A. A. 2d 48 (1976).” See also: U. S. v. Sarihifard, 155 F. 3d 301 (1998, 4th Circuit), “A defendant is guilty of grand jury perjury when the government proves: (1) that the defendant gave false testimony to the grand jury under oath; (2) that the testimony was false; (3) that the false testimony was given knowingly; and (4) that the subject matter of the testimony was material to grand jury’s investigation. U. S. v. Friedhaber, 856 F. 2d 640, 642 (1988, 4th Cir.). A person is guilty of making false statement to a government agency when the government proves that: the defendant made a false statement to a government agency or concealed a fact from it or use a false document knowing that is to be false; (2) the defendant acted knowingly or willfully; (3 ) the false statement or concealed fact or false document was material to a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency. An essential element in both grand jury perjury and the crime of making false statements is materiality. See: United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) “A statement is material if it has a natural tendency to influence or is capable of influencing the decision-making body to which it was addressed.” It is irrelevant whether the false statement actually influenced or affected the decision-making process of the agency or fact-finding body. See also: United States v. Paolicelli, 505 F. 2d 971, 973 (1974, 4th Cir.); United States v. Bailey, 769 F. 2d 203 (1985, 4th Cir.); U. S. v. Dickerson, 114 F 3d 464 (1997, 4th Cir.)."

Appellant's contends that by presenting the same false information to the alleged grand jury of testimony from The Georgetown County Sherriff’s Department that The Sheriff’s Department had statements from victim’s finance,’ Naomi Alston, and victim’s father, Aundry Evans, Sr., that victim allegedly told them that Terron Dizzley shot him, which is the same false declarations made by The Georgetown Sherriff’s Department, to the magistrate to obtain his unlawful arrest warrant, according to Private Investigator, Bennie L. Webb Investigative Report, was clearly material and had a substantial influence on the alleged grand jury decision to indict which prejudiced Appellant and was not harmless.

 Appellant contends that The United States Supreme Court established in Bank of Nova Scotia v. U.S., 487 U.S. 250 (1988), that an indictment maybe dismissed because of prosecutorial misconduct in grand jury proceedings if such misconduct prejudiced defendant and was a significant infringement on grand jury’s ability to exercise independent judgment. See also: U. S. v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986); Kotteakos v. U. S., 328 U.S. 750 (1946). See: Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78 (1935), “Prosecutor’s duty is not only to use every legitimate means to bring about a just conviction, but to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrong conviction." Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), “A state may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony to obtain a tainted conviction. Conviction obtained through use of false testimony, known to be such by representative of the state, is a denial of due process.” Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Giglio v. U S., 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967).

 Appellant contends that his arrest warrant tainted the entire judicial process which led to his false imprisonment for almost nine years and counting, because the legal process he received failed to establish what the Fourth Amendment makes essential to believe that he committed a crime. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017), “Fourth Amendment prohibits government officials from detaining a person in the absence of probable which can happen when the police holds someone without any reason before the formal onset of a criminal proceeding or when legal process itself goes wrong, such as when judge’s probable-cause determination is predicated solely on a police officer’s false statements. The Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful pretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” Elills v. U. S., 356 U.S. 674 (1958), “The Supreme Court held that an issue on appeal as to probable cause for an arrest could not be necessarily characterized as frivolous and application for leave to appeal informa pauperis should have been granted.”

FRUIT OF THE POISIONOUS TREE, DUE PROCESS VIOLATION

 Appellant contends that the record shows that the state’s entire case rested solely on Investigator Garrett’s botched investigation and the same fabricated evidence he presented to the magistrate to obtain Appellant's arrest warrant. The record show that the state presented testimony from Naomi Alston, victim’s finance and Jerilether Jones, victim’s girlfriend, (who were not witnesses of the crime) of a photo-line-up procedure conducted by Investigator Garrett and Investigator Dustin Morris, which alleged that Alston and Jones picked Appellant out of a photo lineup not as the person who committed the crime, but, as the person they allegedly knew by the nickname(s), “D” or “Little D” and that they believed that the victim was speaking of Appellant when he allegedly made the “hearsay” statement.

 Appellant contends that the record shows that the solicitor’s sole purpose for presenting the photo-line-up was to mislead and confuse the jury and to unlawfully “pin” the nickname on Appellant as the shooter. Whereas, when the trial judge asked the solicitor was her purpose for presenting the photo-lineups was to show that Jerilether and Alston picked out someone whom they knew “too” by nicknames, “D” or “Little D” and not for the purpose of who committed the crime. The solicitor agreed that this was her purpose. See: Tr. P. 118, L. 17 – P. 119, L. 1 – 4. However, the solicitor then made the following misleading statement, “specifically, Ms. Alston and Miss Jones picked this defendant out of a lineup as being “the one” referred to by nickname." See: Tr. P. 119, L. 23 – 25.

 Appellant contends that it was found through after-discovered evidence which consisted of the transcription of three CD’s, which consisted of interviews and statements taken by Investigator Garrett and Investigator Dustin Morris of the Georgetown County Sherriff’s Department of state’s witnesses which proves prosecutorial misconduct.

PROSECUTURAL MISCONDUCT

 Appellant contends that the state knowingly presented false testimony from key witness, Douglas Morris, whom he never met, seen or knew, who has never met, seen or known Appellant, to intentionally make false statements for the state, testifying falsely in both of Appellant's trials, that he knew Appellant by the nickname, “Little D,” or “D.” Appellant found out through the discovery of the transcriptions of these CD’s that Douglas Morris, on December 2, 2008, the day after the shooting, in which Appellant was charged, gave statements to Investigators Garrett and Investigator Dustin Morris in the presence of his mother, Sonia Jones, and his sister, Jerilether Jones. In this interview, Douglas stated that after Aundry was shot, he allegedly made a statement “D” was the one who shot him in reference to the unknown, unidentified shooter according to witnesses was wearing a mask and hoodie and other articles of clothing to hide their identity. During this interview, Investigator Garrett then asked Douglas Morris, “Do you know who “D” is”? Douglas Morris responded, “No Sir.” Investigator Garrett also asked Douglas Morris during this interview, “This guy you saw come in did he remind you of anybody that you may have seen before. Douglas responded, “No Sir, not really.”

See: Transcription of Douglas Morris Interview of December 2, 2008, Taken by Investigators Melvin Garrett and Dustin Morris, Tr. P. 7, Lines 7 – 14.

   7. Sonia: What did Aundry say to Y’all in the club after he

   8. got shot?

   9. (A) He told us that “D” was the one who shot him.

10. (Q) Dee ?

11. (A) Yes, he said that he recognized him by his voice and Dee

12. was the one who shot him.

13. (Q) Do you know who D is?

14. (A) No Sir.

            See also: Tr., P. 4, Lines 24 – P. 5, L1

24. (Q) This guy that you saw come in, did he remind you

25. of anybody that you may have seen before?

   1. (A) No. Sir, not really.

FALSE TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS MORRIS PRESENTED BY SOLICITOR, SCOTT HIXON IN PETITIONER’S FIRST TRIAL OF 2012

 Appellant contends that the record proves that Solicitor Scott Hixon, in the first of 2012, knew that Douglas Morris gave statements to Investigator Garrett and Dustin rrt5tMorris stating that he did not know who this “D” was, allegedly mentioned by the victim. Yet, Solicitor Hixon, knowingly presented Douglas Morris’ false testimony that he knew Appellant by the nickname, ”D,” which is a direct connection to Investigator Garrett’s botched investigation, and false declarations made to the magistrate to obtain Appellant's unlawful arrest warrant.

State v. Terron Dizzley, 2012

Motion, Tr. 70, L15 – P. 71, L1

15 … Aundry did clearly state, “I

16. cannot believe “D” done to me. I recognize his voice”

17. (Q). Okay, what was the environment or the - what was the

18. environment like after the shooting in the, in that space?

19. (A) I mean, everybody was in shock . Like after, after he

20. stated the name I guess a couple of as friends that had been out

21. there before had knew who “D” or whatever. They was in

22. shock. I was in shock myself from just seeing him a couple of

23. times before.

24. (Q) Okay, did you know Terron Dizzley prior to that evening?

25. I seen him like four or five times before, but as far as

1. (P. 71) like having a conversation like, no , no, Sir, I don't.

Trial of (2012) Direct by State

Tr. P. 247, L 25 – P 248, L1 – 7

 25. (Q) Okay, did you know prior to this Terron Dizzley?

   1. (A) I saw him a few times before.

   2. (Q) Okay, did you know him by nickname?

   3. (A) “D”.

  4. (Q) Okay, and do you recognize “D” in the courtroom today?

  5. (A) Yes, sir, I do.

  6. (Q). And where is he?

  7. (A) Sitting right there.

 This is proof that Solicitor Hixon, in Appellant's first trial, knew that Douglas Morris either lied in his testimony at the first trial of 2012, or he lied in his statements given to Investigator Garrett on December 2, 2008. See: State v. Stanley, 365 S.C. 24 (2005).

This is also proof that Solicitor, Erin Bailey, in Appellant's second trial of 2014, knew that Solicitor Hixon knowingly presented Douglas Morris’ false testimony in Appellant's first trial of 2012 that he knew Appellant by the nickname, “D, ”which is contrary to his initial statements given to Investigator Garrett given on December 2, 2008. However, the record shows that Solicitor Bailey deliberately compromised the integrity of the fact-finding and truth-seeking process by knowingly introducing Douglas Morris’ false testimony, again, in Appellant's second trial of 2014, as to Appellant's identity being that of “D” or “Little D” to obtain an unlawful conviction.

FALSE TESTIMONY OF DOUGLAS PRESENTED BY SOLICITOR BAILY IN SECOND TRIAL OF 2014

See: State v. Terron Dizzley (2014)

Tr. P. 265, L 13 – 25.

13. (Q) And did you know this Mr. Dizzley at the time?

14. (A) I've seen him four or five times before prior to the

15. event , but I didn't actually have a conversation with him as

16. knowing him

17. (Q) Okay, in what context did you see Mr. Dizzley?

18. (A) Ma’am?

19. (Q). What occasion would you have had to have seen Mr.

20. Dizzley?

21. (A) If Aundry brought him around the house just every now and

22. then.

23. (Q) Okay. What was your understanding, based on your

24. personal knowledge, of the relationship between Andre Evans,

25. Jr., and Mr. Terron Dizzley?

   1. (A) he never talked about that with me. (P. 266 )

            See: (2014), Tr. P. 278, L6 – 11

1. (A) Did you ever hear Aundry Evans, Jr. , who you called a

2. brother, referred to anyone else as “Little D” or “D”?

3. (A). No, ma’am.

4. (Q) Okay, so if he says “Little D” or “D”, who do you think he's

5. referring to?

6. (A) He was referring to as Terron.

Appellant contends that not only did the Solicitor knowingly present Morris’ false testimony, but the Solicitor also presented his testimony to mislead the jury and make false statements that the victim recognized Appellant's voice. However, this was false and not supported by the record. “Further, in Mr. Douglas’ proffered, testimony, Your Honor heard that in just a few moments Mr. Douglas is going to testify that the victim was able to recognize the defendant's voice.” The Solicitor knew that none of the witnesses stated that Aundry “allegedly” stated that “Terron Dizzley” shot him, and he recognized “Terron Dizzley” by his voice. The Solicitor's false statements to the Judge proves that she intentionally introduced Douglas Morris’ false testimony to unlawfully, maliciously “pin” false nicknames on Appellant as the shooter, and that Aundry “allegedly” stated that he recognized "Terron Dizzley" by voice.

See: (2014), Tr. P. 271, L 24, - P. 272, L1 – 2.

It is clear from the record that The Solicitor Bailey knew of Douglas Morris’ initial interview of December 2, 2008, the time, day, and contents of Morris’ statements, because they were part of the state's investigation, and the Solicitor made references to these interviews during redirect, and also Mr. Barr made references to them on cross by defense. However, Solicitor Bailey neither Trial Counsel Barr mentioned that Douglas Morris had stated in his initial statement that he did not know who this alleged "D" was, nor did Solicitor Bailey correct Douglas Morris's false testimony.

Direct by State (2014, Tr. P. 286, L 14 – 16)

    14. (Q) the police officer that you told this to at your

    15. mother's house the next day, do you remember was he black or white?

    16. (A) He was black.

  Cross by Defense (2014, Tr.84, L 9 – 17)

      9. (Q) When did you tell police, if you did, that you

     10. heard Aundry make a statement?

     11. (A) December 2 , 2008,

     12. (Q) And you heard Aundry make a statement?

     13. (A) Yes, Sir.

     14. (Q) And you do know who you told that to?

     15. (A) I don't know which police officer.

    16. (Q) Where were you at the time you told then?

    17. (A) I was at my mother's house.

 The Solicitor even admitted in closing arguments that she knew some of her witnesses were not telling the truth. However, the Solicitor knowingly presented their false testimonies anyway.

Closing Arguments by the State

(2014, Tr. P. 714, L 17. 22)

 “I wanted each and every, every one of you to know what every person who may have witnessed anything having to do with this saw. Some of them saw a lot. Some of them can't remember. Some of them aren't telling the truth. Clearly, I didn't tell them what to say or they would have done better.”

             Appellant contends that it is clearly established that a conviction obtained through knowingly use of false testimony is a denial of due process. Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 39 (2006); Gibson v. State, 334 S.C. 515 (1999); Washington v. State, 324 S.C. 232 (1996); Napue v. Illinois, supra, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); Berger v. U.S., supra, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).

 Appellant contends that such false and misleading in-court identification of him as “the one” referred to by nickname pursuant to the alleged “hearsay” statement by victim that “D” or “Little D” shot him, pursuant to the out-of-court photo line-up procedure and testimony from Jerilether Jones and Naomi Alston, and the fact that the solicitor knowingly presented false testimony from Douglas Morris as to knowing Appellant by the nickname “D” or “Little D”, and eliciting testimony from Douglas Morris that the victim was speaking of Appellant when he made the alleged statement pursuant to the nicknames as to who shot him which is a direct connection to the same false declarations that Investigator Garrett made to the magistrate to obtain Appellant's arrest warrant violated his Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process and should have been suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See: Humbert v. Mayor and City Counsel of Baltimore City, 866 F. 3d. 546 (2007 4th Cir.),“(1) Statement in arrest warrant application, that rape victim had positively identified arrestee as her attacker was, false, and its inclusion in application amounted to, at least, recklessness; (2) Warrant application was invalid based on officers’’ reckless inclusion of a material false statement; (3) Officers lack of probable cause to make arrest independent of invalid arrest warrant; (4) Legal process instituted against arrestee, and his resulting pretrial detention, were unsupported by probable cause.” See: U. S. v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980),“For purposes of determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation requires exhaustion of a victim’s in-court identification of the accused, identification has three distinctive elements, first, the victim is present at trial to testify as to what transpired between her and offender, and to identify defendant as the culprit; second, the victim possesses knowledge of and ability to reconstruct prior criminal occurrence and identity defendant from her observations at the time of the crime; and third, defendant is also physically present in the courtroom so that the victim can observe him and compare his appearance to that of the offender.” See also: U. S. v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), “Court would reject Government’s suggestion to adopt per se rule that live witnesses should not be excluded at trial no matter how close and proximate the connection between it and a violation of The Fourth Amendment.” Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963), “Even though informant had been under police surveillance and heroin was found in his possession upon his arrest, information that he had bought heroin from “Blackie Toy”, identified only as proprietor of laundry on specified street, constituted insufficient cause for arrest of defendant who answered doorbell at “Oyes Laundry” on specified street. Information to vague and from too untested a source to permit judicial officer to accept it as probable cause for arrest warrant is insufficient information upon which to base arrest without warrant. Verbal evidence which derives immediately from unlawful entry and unauthorized arrest is not less the “fruit” of official illegality than more common tangible fruits of unwarranted intrusion, and Fourth Amendment may protect against overhearing of verbal statements as well as against more traditional seizure of papers and effects.” Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).

 Appellant contends that the state also presented witnesses, Maurice Giles and Willie Stanley whose testimony was also the result of Investigator Garrett’s botched investigation, and their testimonies were also about allegedly hearing victim state that “D” or “Little D” shot him and the state also used their testimonies to falsely attribute these nicknames to Appellant as being “the one” victim was allegedly speaking of as to who shot him pursuant to the alleged hearsay statement, is a causal connection between the same false declarations that Investigator Garrett made to the magistrate to obtain Appellant's arrest warrant.

The record shows that the state also presented Investigator Garrett and Investigator Dustin Morris as witnesses to testify about their investigation and what lead them to obtain an arrest warrant for Appellant, which only bolstered the witnesses’ false testimony pursuant to the photo line-up procedures of Naomi Alston, Jerilether Jones and other witnesses pursuant to falsely identifying Appellant by nickname pursuant to obtaining Appellant's deficient arrest warrant. Wong Sun v. U.S., supra, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; U. S. v. Ceccolini, supra, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).

 For these reasons, according to clearly established United States Supreme Court Law, the testimonies of Naomi Alston, Jerilether Jones, Douglas Morris, Maurice Giles, Willie Stanley, Investigator Garrett and Investigator Dustin Morris testimonies pursuant to any in-court or out-of-court identification of Appellant should have been suppressed on the grounds that they were obtained as a result of “fruit of the poisonous tree” pursuant to Investigator Garrett’s botched investigations which lead to Appellant's unlawful seizure pursuant to the deficient arrest warrant and “false declarations” made to the magistrate to obtain his arrest warrant. See: Testimonies of state witnesses, trial of 2014, that should have been suppressed , Naomi Alston Tr. P. 105 – 116; 175 – 234; Jerilether Jones, Tr. P. 245 – 263; Douglas Morris, Tr. P. 124 – 130; 264 – 285; Maurice Giles, Tr. P. 189 – 103; 288 – 297; Willie Stanley, Tr. P. 75 – 86; 312 – 355; Investigator Melvin Garrett, Tr. P. 538 – 566; Investigator Dustin Morris, Tr. P. 582 – 626.

Appellant contends that for the foregoing reasons, his unlawful seizure, false imprisonment pursuant to an invalid arrest warrant in which the Arresting Officer, Investigator Melvin Garrett’s, affidavit did not provide any information to enable a magistrate to determine probable cause and made false declarations to obtain Appellant's arrest warrant, violated Appellant's Fourth Amendment Rights and tainted the entire legal process, resulting in a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Violation, therefore, resulting in a conviction based on evidence pursuant to “fruit of the poisonous tree“, which should have been suppressed, and resulted in a confinement contrary to the constitution and fundamental law and was without jurisdiction. Therefore, Appellant's unlawful conviction should be vacated and set aside.

STATE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS

S.C. Code 1976 ₴ 16-3-910, “Kidnapping”. See Also, 16-3-920, “ Conspiracy to Kidnap”, whic is also defined as “false imprisonment: See State v. Berntsen, 295 S. C. 51 (1988); S.C. Constitution, Art. I, ₴ 10, “Search and Seizures, Invasion of Privacy”.

FEDERAL STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS

Amend. 4, U. S. Const. “Search and Seizures, Warrants”; 18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1201, “Kidnapping”; 18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 241, (Conspiracy Against Rights); 242, (Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law); 42 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1985, “Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights”; ₴ 1986, “A c t ti on Neglect to Prevent; ₴ 1988, ‘Proceeds and Vindication of Civil Rights

ARGUMENT 5

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS - COMMISSIONER BRYAN STIRLING, GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA, GOVERNOR HENRY McMASTER, WARDENS LEROY CARTLEDGE, MICHAEL STEPHON, WILLIAMS, RAVENELL, KENNETH NELSON

These individuals have and is still committing the crimes of kidnapping, false imprisonment against me, holding me against my will, in the SC Department of Corrections without any legal or jurisdictional authority.

The record shows that these individuals were notified of my false imprisonment through my habeas corpus, filed January 7, 2020. See: Terron Dizzley v. Stephon No. 2020 WL 8413552, and also through civil actions, Terron Dizzley v. Scott Hixon et. al., No. 2020 WL 9211156. These petitions contained evidence supported by clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law which proves that I am falsely held in prison without legal authority. Yet, I still remain in prison.

In Whirl v. Kern, 407 F. 2d 781 (1968), It was established that a Wardens’, “Failure to know of a court proceeding terminating all charges against one held in custody is not, as a matter of law, adequate legal justification for an unauthorized restraint. Persons guilty of false imprisonment are subject to both criminal and civil penalties.”

STATE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS

S.C. Code 1976 ₴ 16-3-910, “Kidnapping”. See Also, 16-3-920, “ Conspiracy to Kidnap”, which is also defined as “false imprisonment: See State v. Berntsen, 295 S. C. 51 (1988); S.C. Constitution, Art. I, ₴ 12, “Double Jeopardy”; ₴ 3, “Privileges and Immunities”.

FEDERAL STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS

Amend. 5, U. S. Const. “Double Jeopardy”; Amend. 14 U. S. Const., “Due Process, Equal Protection of Laws”; Amend. 13 U. S. Const., “Right to Be Free from Slavery”; 18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1201, “Kidnapping”; 18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 241, (Conspiracy Against Rights); 242, (Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law); 42 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1985, “Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights”; ₴ 1986 Action for Neglect to Prevent; ₴ 1988, ‘Proceeds and Vindication of Civil Rights.

ARGUMENT 6

VIOLATION OF HATE CRIMES ACT, 18 U.S.C. A. ₴ 249; U.S.C. A. AMENDMENT 13, FALSE IMPRISONMENT, KIDNAPPING, ASSUALT, AND SLAVERY

The unlawful acts of The Georgetown County Sherriff’s Department unlawfully seizing Petitioner for a murder in 2008 pursuant to an invalid arrest warrant, and The Georgetown County Solicitor’s Office prosecuting Petitioner twice for the crimes of murder without indictment by a Grand Jury of which Petitioner was acquitted in his first trial of 2012, and tried again for the same offense in 2014, and unlawfully convicted in violation of the Fifth Amendment Double Clause resulted in eight years and counting of being falsely imprisoned. Each incident including The South Carolina Department of Corrections’ unlawful actions of holding Petitioner imprisoned for eight years and counting without any legal nor jurisdictional authority resulted to the unlawful subjection of “slavery”, kidnapping, assault and battery, and federal hate crimes in violation of The Thirteenth Amendment and The Hate Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 249.

Statement of Facts 

Petitioner contends that the record shows that on December 12, 2008, he was unlawfully arrested by The Georgetown County, South Carolina Sheriff's Department pursuant to an invalid arrest warrant which is constitutionally deficient under The Fourth Amendment, whereas, the affidavit in the arrest warrant does not provide any information to unable a magistrate to determine probable cause. According to clearly established federal law, as determined by The United States Supreme Court, such unlawful arrest is kidnapping, false imprisonment, assault, and an unlawful subjection to slavery. See Ground 4.

In The Fourth Circuit, which is the circuit for South Carolina, it was determined in ” U. S. v Alvarez, 351 F. 3d. 126 (2003 4th Cir.), “that the standard for an acquittal is when a judge recites the following: “that the evidence was insufficient for any reasonable jury to return a unanimous verdict of guilty”.

Petitioner contents that in first trial of 2012, The Honorable Judge Michael Baxley recited the standard for acquittal almost word-for-word, (verbatim), what Alvarez has determined is the standard for acquittal, that his decision to declare a mis-trial was not a failure on the part of jury that they could reach a unanimous verdict, but that his decision to declare a mistrial was a “strong message to the prosecution that they were unable to meet their “burden of proof” to the extent that they could reach a unanimous verdict. See: Evans v. Michigan, 568 U. S. 313 (2013). It is undisputed according to clearly established United States Supreme Court law that The Honorable Judge Baxley’s ruling was an acquittal.

Petitioner contends that according to United States Supreme Court Law, the moment that The Honorable Judge Baxley made his ruling that the State failed to meet its burden of proof to the extent that they could bring back a unanimous verdict, and then discharged his jury, the jurisdiction terminated upon his case. See: U. S. v Scott, Supra, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); U. S. v Wilson, Supra, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).

According to United States Supreme Court Law, the moment that the Georgetown County Solicitor’s Office made a conscious decision to try Petitioner again for the same offense and sentenced him to imprisonment without jurisdiction, Petitioner’s case became a criminal matter on behalf of The Georgetown County Solicitor’s Office for false imprisonment, and anyone who participated in Petitioner’s unlawful incarceration became “ trespassers of the law.” Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U. S. 65, (1857), “Where the Court has no jurisdiction or disregards rules of procedure for its exercise, all parties to illegal trials and imprisonment are trespassers on party aggrieved thereby, and he may recover in proper suit in civil courts.” Exparte Lange, 85 U. S. 163 (1873). “The Court initiated what has been described as a long process of expansion of the concept of the lack of jurisdiction. Lange contended that he had been twice sentence for the same offence, in violating the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, when he had been re-sentenced to a term of imprisonment after having paid the fine originally imposed. Carefully disclaiming the use of habeas, as a writ of error, the Supreme Court ordered Lange released from imprisonment because the lower Court's jurisdiction terminated upon the satisfaction of the original sentence. A second judgment of the same verdict is, under such circumstances, void for want of power, and it affords no authority to hold the party a prisoner and must be discharged.”

Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S 168 (1880), “A resolution of the House of Representatives finding a citizen guilty of contempt and warrant of its speaker for his commitment to prison were not conclusive in an action for false imprisonment and no justification to the person making the arrest where the pleading showed that the House was without any authority in the matter.”

Director General of Railroad v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S 25 (1923); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266 (1878); “In action against army officers for assault and battery and false imprisonment, defendants were not entitled to dismissal on ground that their acts were done under authority of orders of the United States during the Civil War, where there were many disputed facts in the case disconnected from any question of authority from such orders, since proof of oppressive or corrupt abuse of authority would authorize verdict for plaintiff.”

Whirl v. Kern, 407 F. 2d 781 (1968), “On November 4, 1962, the indictment pending against Whirl were dismissed by nolle prosequi on the grounds that the evidence against Whirl was “insufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction.” Despite the dismissal, “Whirl languished in jail for almost nine months after all charges against him were dismissed and was not restored to his freedom until July 25, 1963. The central issue in this case is one of privilege, not of fact. The tort of false imprisonment is an intentional tort. It is committed when a man intentionally deprives another of his liberty without the other’s consent and without adequate legal justification. Failure to know of a court proceeding terminating all charges against one held in custody is not, as a matter of law, adequate legal justification for an unauthorized restraint. Were the law otherwise, Whirls’ nine months could easily be nine years, and those nine years, ninety-nine years, and still as a matter of law no redress would follow. The law does not hold the value of a man’s freedom in such low regard.”

It is clearly established by the U. S. Supreme Court that an “acquittal” is a “favorable termination” of a criminal prosecution which invalidates a second trial, judgment, and sentence imposed pursuant to a conviction for the same offense to support a 1983 action for malicious prosecution. See: McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019). “ Under Heck, in order to recovers damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or other harm caused by actions who unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid ₴ 1983 plaintiff first must prove that his conviction had been invalidated in some way; this favorable termination requirement applies whenever a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply that his prior conviction or sentence was invalid. The Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor, held that the statute of limitations for commissioner’s ₴ 1983 fabricated-evidence claim began to run when the criminal proceeding against him terminated in his favor, that is when he was acquitted at the end of his second trial, and not when the evidence was used against him.” U. S. v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82 (1978), “A judgment of an acquittal, whether based on jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict may not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by reversal.” U. S. v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 95 S. Ct. 1013 (1975), “Constitutional protection against government appeals attaches only where there is a danger of subjecting the defendant to a second trial for the same offence. Provision of the Criminal Appeals at of 1907 that government could not have a writ of error in any case where there had been a verdict in favor of the defendant was to assure that the statute would not conflict with the principles of the double jeopardy clause.” Exparte Lange, supra, 85 U. S. 163 (1873). Dynes v. Hoover, supra, 61 U. S. 65, (1857). Elliott v. Peirsol’s Lessee, 26 U. S. 328 (1928).“A judgment rendered by a court which does not have jurisdiction constitutes no justification and persons concern in executing such judgment “are considered in law trespassers”. If the court acts without authority, it's judgments and orders are regarded as nullities, and form no bar to recovery, even prior to reversal.”

 Petitioner contends that the record also shows that he was never indicted for the crimes for which he is falsely imprisoned, which also invalidates his conviction and shows that the South Carolina Department of Corrections has not legal nor jurisdictional authority to hold him in prison. See Exparte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417 (1885). See also Ground 1, 2, and 4. See U. S. v Smith, 49 C.M.R. 416 (1974), “Acquittal of offenses for which apprehended as justified assault in resisting apprehension as regards, this assignment of error, appellate defense counsel, in substance, contend that appellant’s acquittal of the very serious charges (murder) upon which the arrest was predicated served to invalidate and render illegal his arrest and apprehension. In right thereof, their argument continues, reversal of finding of guilty is required because the appellant’s confrontation with, and assault upon Sergeant Smith followed and were in resistance to an illegal arrest and apprehension. This argument has persuasive merit. An illegal arrest is nothing more than an assault and battery and the persons whose liberty has been restrained has the same right as in the case of self-defense – the fight to use the same force in defending himself as he would have against any other unlawful intrusion on his person or liberty. In prosecution for escape from custody of an arresting officer prior to actual imprisonment, the escape has been held justifiable where the officer acted without authority. So that the arrest was illegal. The invalidity of an arrest may also vitiate subsequent proceedings so that an escape from prison is justified. A person illegally arrest is entitled to resist an unlawful interference with his right of personal liberty and may use whatever force is reasonably necessary to do. When an officer without authority to arrest a person attempts nevertheless to arrest him, the officer is to be regarded as a trespasser without any right to prevent the escape of the person he has accosted…27 Am Jur. 2v Escape, Prison Breaking, and Rescue ₴ 8. People v Dreares, 221 NYS 2d 819 321 (1961), “Held that acquittal of defendant upon charges of loitering established that his arrest was unlawful and that he had been entitled to resist arrest with reasonable force.” United States v. Gray, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 615, 20 C.M.R. 331 (1956), There, the accused and others was found guilty of escape from confinement. The Court found that the purported restraint was unlawful because the unit commander had no authority to confine the accused. As a result, the finding of guilty of escape from confinement was set aside and the charges were dismissed.

Petitioner contends that it is clear that the 13th Amendment of the United States Constitution, condones “slavery” for the purpose of punishment for crimes, wherefore, the party has been “legally convicted”. Which means that the warden of prisons in The United States are legal slave owners as to those who are “legally convicted” and imprisoned, and those who are legally convicted and imprisoned are considered as slaves.

However, the record proves that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence was without any legal nor jurisdictional authority, therefore, holds not legal nor jurisdictional authority to hold him in prison. Therefore, the actions of The State of South Carolina, under such circumstances, amount to the hate crimes of unlawful subjection to slavery, kidnapping, false imprisonment, assault and battery and cruel and unusual punishment. See U. S. v Hatch, 722 F. 3d 1193 (2013); U. S. v Jenkins, 909 F. Supp. 2d 758 (2012), “Concluding Albeit reluctantly, that The Hate Crimes Act is constitutional as applied to defendants who kidnapped and transported the victim along a federal highway.”

Therefore, The Thirteenth Amendment protects Petitioner under such circumstances from being unlawfully subjected to slavery or involuntary servitude, and under Section 2 of The Thirteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation on Petitioner’s behalf.

The Thirteenth Amendment also protests Petitioner from the lingering effects of slavery, also know as “Badges and Incidents of Slavery” such as “Black Codes” and Jim Crow Laws” that attempted to perpetuate the master/slave relationship as much as possible after emancipation. These Black Code Laws were designed to lock up Blacks for issues that were not even crimes, such as not having an education, or walking the street at a certain time, in order to get free labor out of them and to enslave them again. This is the history of Southern States such as South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, etc. The Black Codes, and Jim Crow Laws were also abolished as unconstitutional. See: U. S. v Hatch, 722 F. 3d. 1193 (2013).

However, South Carolina still practices these laws. Take Petitioner’s case for example, he has been kidnapped, enslaved, falsely imprisoned without any legal nor jurisdictional authority, all because he has been accused of having been known by the nickname, “D” or “Little D”, which has never been his nickname, pursuant to an “alleged” hearsay statement from the victim, allegedly stating that “D” or “Little D” shot him. The nicknames involved in the alleged “hearsay” statement is vague and according to witnesses, there was not physical description nor information as to who this “D” or “Little D” was, whether this person was male, female, Black, White, Indian or Hispanic.

Although, Petitioner has never been known by “D” nor “Little D”, which is not his nickname. It is not a crime in the United States to have the nickname “D”, “Little D” or any nickname. There must be millions of people in this world with the nickname “D” or “Little D”. This is reminiscent of The Black Code laws, to restrain a person of his liberty for no reason, just to get free labor out of that person , to enslave that person in order to take advantage of The Exception Clause of The Thirteenth Amendment, therefore, The State of South Carolina judicial system has decided on it own, without any law that exist to support this decision nor any evidence which proves that Petitioner has committed any crimes that it unlawful to be known by a nickname.

Petitioner contends that subjecting him to slavery, without any legal authority alone, are hate crimes. See: U. S. v Hatch, 722 F. 3d. 1193 (2013), “The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude, while extending power to Congress to enforce it’s provisions.

 U. S. CONST., AMEND XIII -

Section 1.

Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2.

Congress shall power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

The Thirteenth Amendment was “Near prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20, 3 S. Ct.18 (1883). Beyond simply “nullifying all state laws which establish or uphold slavery”, the Court reasoned that the Thirteenth Amendment has a reflex character also establishing and decreeing universal civil and political freedom throughout the United States and it is assumed that the power vested in Congress to enforce the article by appropriate legislation, closes Congress with power to pass all laws necessary to and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.”

COMMERCE CLAUSE

  Petitioner contends that The Hate Crimes Act also reflects Congress’ power to enforce legislation under the Commerce Clause. United States v Hill, 927 F. 3d 188 (2019 4th Cir.)

Petitioner contends that the records shows that on December 12, 2008, he turned himself in, with an attorney, and claimed his innocence, after finding out that he was charged with the crime of murder in Georgetown, South Carolina. Petitioner contends that it is clearly established that the warrant for his arrest was invalid and constitutionally deficient under The Fourth Amendment, which, held no legal nor jurisdictional authority to arrest Petitioner. The record shows that The Georgetown Sheriff’s Department use a motor vehicle and drove from Georgetown, South Carolina via U. S. Highway to the Sled Building in Columbia, South Carolina to meet with Petitioner’s attorney for Petitioner to turn himself in. Petitioner contends that The Georgetown County Sheriff's Department arrested him pursuant to an unlawful arrest warrant, which is kidnapping, and use a U. S. Highway to drive Petitioner from Columbia, SC to The Georgetown County Detention Center, where Petitioner was unlawfully detained for three and a half months before making bail. See Ground 3.

Petitioner contends that the record shows that he was tried for the crime of murder in Georgetown, South Carolina in 2012,without indictment by a Grand Jury, therefore, without any legal nor jurisdictional authority, and was acquitted of these charges. Petitioner contends that if there were any alleged legal or jurisdictional authority to try his case, according to clearly established United States Supreme Court law, that jurisdiction terminated upon the “judgment of acquittal” from The Honorable Judge Baxley, in his first trial of 2012. However, Petitioner was unlawfully tried again for the same offense in violation of The Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause and was unlawfully convicted, kidnapped, and placed in a motor vehicle via U. S. Highway and taken to the Georgetown County Detention Center.

Petitioner contends that the records shows that two weeks later, he was kidnapped by The South Carolina Department of Corrections and placed in a motor vehicle was taken to Leiber Correctional Institution via U. S. Highway to receive a haircut. Petitioner contends that that same day, he was kidnapped again, placed in a motor vehicle and transported to Kirkland Correctional Institution via U. S. Highway. Twenty-five days later, Petitioner was kidnapped, again, and transported to McCormick Correctional Institution via U. S. Highway where he remained until 2018. Petitioner contends that he was kidnapped, again, and taken to Broad River Correctional Institution, via U. S. Highway, where he remained for two months, and was again kidnapped and transported to Leiber Correctional Institution via U.S. Highway where he remained for one year. In 2019, Petitioner was again kidnapped, placed in a motor vehicle and transported back to Broad Correctional Institution via U. S. Highway where currently remains falsely imprisoned without any legal nor jurisdictional authority. See: U. S. v Jenkins, 909 F. Supp. 2d 758 (2012), “Thus, even though the Jenkinses never crossed state lines, their use of a car to secret Pennington to the place where they beat him triggers the “instrumentalities of interstate commerce” jurisdictional element of the H.C.P.A. The Sixth Circuit held that “cars are themselves instrumentalities of commerce, which Congress may protect.” United States v McHenry, 97 F. 3d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1996) quoting United States v Oliver, 60 F. 3d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1995). In fact, motor vehicles have been described as “the quintessential instrumentalities of modern interstate commerce.” To more clearly define these limits, the Court summarized its previous Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and set forth “three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its Commerce Clause power.” U. S. v Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (1995). The Court articulated those categories as follows: First, Congress may regulate the use of channels of Interstate Commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” See also U. S. v Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000); Gonzales v Ralph, 545 U. S. 1 (2003); Taylor v U. S., 579 U. S. 301 (2016).

Petitioner contends that he has clearly demonstrated that the wrongful acts committed against him led to eight years and counting of false imprisonment in the South Carolina Department of Corrections, which under The Thirteenth Amendment is “slavery."

Petitioner contends that he has met the second and third categories of Lopez, that from the beginning of his unlawful incarceration, the crimes committed against him of kidnapping were accomplished by the use of motor vehicles and the use of the U.S. Highways. Petitioner contends that he has also met the requirements of the first category of Lopez, whereas, clearly Petitioner’s eight years and counting of being enslaved by the South Department of Corrections, is economic in nature to the State of South Carolina.

For the foregoing reasons, the unlawful acts of The Georgetown County Sherriff’s Department unlawfully seizing Petitioner for a murder in 2008 pursuant to an invalid arrest warrant, and The Georgetown County Solicitor’s Office prosecuting Petitioner twice for the crimes of murder without indictment by a Grand Jury, of which Petitioner was acquitted in his first trial of 2012, and tried again for the same offense in 2014, and unlawfully convicted in violation of the Fifth Amendment Double Clause resulted in eight years and counting of being falsely imprisoned. Each incident including The South Carolina Department of Corrections unlawful actions of holding Petitioner imprisoned for eight years and counting without any legal nor jurisdictional authority resulted to the unlawful subjection of “slavery”, kidnapping, assault and battery, and federal hate crimes in violation of The Thirteenth Amendment and The Hate Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. A. ₴ 249.

 For the foregoing reasons, in the interest of liberty and justice, Petitioner must be immediately released from being kidnapped, falsely imprisoned for eight years and counting by The South Carolina Department of Corrections and The State of South Carolina.

ARGUMENT 7

JEREMEY A. THOMPSON, SOUTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS, LEAH B. MOODY, ELEANOR CLEARY, JUDGE WILLIAM H. SEALS, ATTORNEY GENERAL, JOHNNY JAMES, JUDGE KRISTI CURTIS, CHIEF JUSTICE, BEATTY, CLERK OF COURT OF GEORGETOWN, SC, ALMA Y. WHITE, AND JEANETTE W. McBRIDE, CLERK OF COURT OF RICHLAND COUNTY.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Petitioner was tried in Georgetown, SC in August 2012 for the charge of murder. The Honorable Judge Baxley abruptly stopped deliberations after only three to four hours and stated that the prosecution “that they are unable to meet their “burden of proof” to the extent that they can bring back a unanimous verdict”, and discharged the jury, improvidently declaring a mistrial after giving a ruling that according to clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court was an “acquittal."

Two years later in 2014, Petitioner was tried again for the same offense in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause and Petitioner was unlawfully convicted pursuant to the second trial of March 31, 2014.

Petitioner’s trial counsel timely filed a Notice of Appeal, and he was appointed Susan B. Hacket on direct appeal. On April 16, 2015, Petitioner hired attorney Jeremy A. Thompson to investigate “juror misconduct” and file a motion for new trial. Attorney Thompson then mislead Petitioner, substituted himself as Appellate Counsel, and withdrew Petitioner’s direct appeal without obtaining any transcripts, without fully investigating Petitioner’s case or advising him of the merits of his appeal or dangers of withdrawing his direct appeal as of right, and without filing an Anders Brief. Attorney Thompson filed the request to withdraw petitioner’s direct appeal as of right on July 9, 2015, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals granted the request to withdraw direct appeal on July 16, 2015, without an Anders Brief or an independent judicial determination of appeal merit. Attorney Thompson then filed a PCR, in which Petitioner paid Attorney Thompson a total of $15,000. Attorney Thompson then abandoned Petitioner’s PCR. Petitioner has been diligently fighting for seven (8) years to have his direct appeal reinstated as of right.

In 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition of Habeas Corpus, 28 U.S.C §2254 only raising the issue to reinstate direct appeal. See: Dizzley v Cartledge, 2017 WL 92886979.

On February 27, 2017, the U.S District Court issued a Report and Recommendation to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies.

On April 3, 2017, Petitioner filed objections to Report and Recommendation supporting the objections with evidence and cases which shows that the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation Order was contrary to clear established federal law as determined by the U.S Supreme Court. To no avail.

James K. Falk

After Jeremy A. Thompson was relieved as counsel, Petitioner was appointed James K Falk. Petitioner then sent Attorney Falk evidence in which he discovered after incarcerated which was exculpatory, impeaching, and proved Prosecutorial Misconduct by knowingly presenting false testimony to obtain a conviction. Petitioner requested that Attorney Falk file a Motion for New Trial, After-Discovered Evidence pursuant to SCR Criminal Procedure 29(b) and also a Motion for A New Trial Brady violation. Petitioner also explain to Attorney Falk that he never had a complete Rule 5 Discovery, case file, or complete copy of his first trial transcript of his 2012 trial and requested that Attorney Falk obtain these materials.

Attorney Falk responded in a letter with misleading information that “there is no such Rule 29(b)”. Petitioner wrote Attorney Falk again and provided him with the Rule and he continued to mislead Petitioner that such rule does not exist. Petitioner then filed a Motion to Relieve attorney Falk, and Attorney Falk also filed a Motion to Relieve himself as Counsel.

On February 10, 2017, at Petitioner’s first PCR, Petitioner addressed these issues to the Honorable Judge Michael G. Nettles. Petitioner’s Motion to Relieve Counsel and to proceed pro se was denied and Judge Nettle’s granted Petitioner’s request for funds to obtain discovery and granted a continuance. Although Attorney Falk did not have any of the Petitioner’s discovery, Attorney Falk, before the PCR hearing began, tried to convince Petitioner to move forward with his PCR anyway. After the PCR, Attorney Falk admitted that he had mislead Petitioner, that he knew about Rule 29(b), apologized, and promised to be honest moving forward. However, Attorney Falk stopped communicating with Petitioner completely.

Attorney Falk did amend the following issues to Petitioner’s PCR:

1. Ineffective assistance of Appellate Counsel Jeremy A. Thompson, P.O. Box 12891, Columbia, SC 29211. Mr. Thompson was retained to represent Applicant on his appeal from his conviction. Mr. Thompson failed to fully investigate the case and provided ineffective assistance in advising Applicant of the merits of his appeal.

2. The State failed to provide trial counsel with copies of prior recorded statements by the State’s witnesses which contradicted the witnesses’ trial testimony; and such failure to disclose

was in violation of the obligation under the Brady v. Maryland.

3. Trial counsel failed to fully investigate the case and failed to interview the State’s Witnesses before trial.

4. Applicant is in possession of newly acquired evidence that trial counsel should have used in preparing his defense; namely transcripts of statements from Willie Stanley, Larry Cooper, Douglas Morris, Sonia Jones, and Toni Jones. The information in these statements should have been used to impeach the State’s Witnesses.

On January 11, 2017, Petitioner filed a Motion for a New Trial of After-Discovered Evidence in General Sessions under a SCR Criminal Procedure Rule 29(b). However, Clerk of Court Alma Y. White refused to file Petitioner’s motion although Petitioner was not represented by counsel in General Sessions. Petitioner also sent a copy of this motion to the Administrative Judge, Honorable Judge Benjamin Culbertson and explained to him the circumstances. Judge Culbertson also refused to assist Petitioner in filing the motion(s) (also filed was a Motion for New Trial, Brady violation), although the evidence proved Petitioner’s innocence and Prosecutorial Misconduct and Petitioner had Constitutional right to access the courts and file motions in a court proceeding where he was not represented by counsel.

Leah B. Moody

On or about October 19, 2017, Petitioner’s mother seek representation from Leah B. Moody pursuant to Petitioner’s PCR. Leah B. Moody mislead Petitioner’s mother indicating that she would charge $6,500.00 and needed the money upfront. Leah B. Moody then contacted a Judge and the Attorney General by telephone without Petitioner’s knowledge or informed consent in writing and had herself illegally substituted as Petitioner’s Counsel.

The first time the Petitioner spoke to Leah B. Moody was during a telephone conference and explained to her that he did not agree or give consent to her representation and that he would like her to charge him for the cost of the phone conference and return the remainder of the $6500.00 paid to her and relieve herself of the fraudulent representation. Leah B. Moody disrespectfully refused and continued to perpetrate illegally as Petitioner’s lawyer. Petitioner filed a motion to relieve Leah B. Moody as counsel and Georgetown Clerk of Court, Alma Y. White, refused to file Petitioner’s motion, therefore, denying Petitioner’s access to the courts. Petitioner’s mother called Leah B. Moody in an attempt to resolve these matters, and Leah Moody became so disrespectful that Petitioner’s Mother filed a complaint with the SC Bar Association and the Commission of Lawyers Conduct, to no avail.

Eleanor Cleary

Petitioner’s mother then sought representation from Attorney Eleanor Duffy Cleary.

Petitioner’s mother explained to Eleanor Cleary what Leah B. Moody did, and previous lawyers and explained that Attorney Cleary would need to speak with Petitioner first before obtaining representation and get his informed consent in writing before substitution of counsel, to avoid any further conflicts. However, Attorney Cleary also mislead Petitioner’s mother and swindled her out of $10,000.

On or about August 31, 2018, Petitioner received a letter from Eleanor Cleary whom he had never met or gave consent to representation stating that “I am happy to tell you that Judge Seals very hesitantly granted the motion to continue the case to November. Therefore, I am now your counsel, and the case will definitely be heard the week of November 26, 2018. He will not allow any more continuances or substitutions of counsel. I need you to sign the enclosed fee agreement and release for information and send it back to me as soon as possible. I will be in touch with you soon.” Petitioner contends that he never signed the fee agreement and wrote Attorney Cleary and explained to her that he did not agree to the fraudulent representation and to return his mother’s funds.

Attorney Cleary came to visit Petitioner at Liebra Corrections and told him that he was “stuck” with her because Judge Seals would not allow any more substitutions. Petitioner explained to attorney Cleary that this was fraud, illegal. However, Attorney Cleary refused to return the $10,000, and continued to perpetrate illegally as Petitioner’s counsel. Petitioner filed a motion to relieve Attorney Cleary and Georgetown County Clerk of Court, Alma Y. White, refused to file Petitioner’s motion, therefore, denying Petitioner access to the courts.

After obtaining this unlawful representation Attorney Cleary began to sabotage Petitioner’s case, withdrawing issues already amended and amending new issues without Petitioner’s consent, terminating subpoenas of critical witnesses (alibi witness), and withdrawing Petitioner’s issue of Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel to reinstate his direct appeal.

Petitioner addressed many of these issues at his November 28, 2018, PCR hearing. Immediately after the PCR hearing, before any briefs were filed or rulings entered, Petitioner filed another motion to relieve counsel and requested for Attorney Cleary to file a Motion to Relieve herself from the fraudulent representation. Attorney Cleary filed a motion to be relieved as counsel on December 27, 2018, and another on June 25, 2019. However, Alma Y. White, Clerk of Court of Georgetown, again refused to file Petitioner’s motion.

Petitioner then filed a writ of mandamus in Georgetown County to relieve Attorney Cleary and again Clerk of Court, Alma Y. White, refused to file Petitioner’s motion and writ. Petitioner then filed the writ of mandamus in the SC Supreme Court, requesting that the Courts direct Judge Curtis to: “protect Petitioner’s rights to be provided with an adequate and fair corrective process for hearing a determination of claims of violations of federal constitutional guarantees to challenge the unjust, unconstitutional conviction which was imposed on him. By relieving Attorney Cleary of this fraudulent representation, allowing Applicant to proceed Pro Se, amend, and brief all issues after obtaining discovery and submit evidence and affidavits, etc. to support his claims."

Petitioner also explained in his writ of mandamus and motions to relieve counsel that any further attempts to force illegal representation upon him, and any rulings made pursuant to any issues amended and briefed by Attorney Cleary, would be “Fraud upon the Court.” Petitioner contends that the South Carolina Supreme Court intentionally and willfully turned a blind eye to the crimes that were being committed against him and issued an order stating that they did not have jurisdiction to prevent these crimes from being committed against him. This is contrary to clearly established U.S. Supreme Court law and South Carolina’s own laws under such circumstances.

On June 25, 2019, Petitioner filed a civil action against Eleanor Cleary for fraud, before any briefs were filed or any rulings were made on his PCR. The civil action was filed in the state court for fraud and legal malpractice. See C.A. No. 2019-CP-40-03442. As a result of this civil action, Eleanor Clearly filed another motion to relieve herself as counsel explaining that the courts must relieve her of Petitioner’s counsel because he had filed a civil action against her and remaining as Petitioner’s lawyer would be a conflict of interest. However, Judge Curtis forced Eleanor Cleary to illegally represent Petitioner and forced her to brief Petitioner’s issues while a civil action was pending against her and refused to accept the fact that Eleanor Cleary was never legally Petitioner’s lawyer.

On November 21, 2019, Judge Curtis issued an order denying Petitioner’s PCR. On December 9, 2019, Eleanor Cleary filed a Rule 59 (e) Motion for Reconsideration of the Denial of Post-Conviction Relief. Page 5, paragraph 7 states:

“Finally, Counsel asked this court to address the motion to be relieved in a separate order so that she would not be forced to argue it in conjunction with the strong and meritorious post-conviction relief claims that Applicant has.” However, this Court declined to do so. Counsel must, therefore, reiterate that because Applicant is currently suing counsel in Richland County Court of Common Pleas for monetary damages, for which counsel has had to retain counsel to represent her, and which is ongoing, she has a conflict of interest. This Court mistakenly asserts that only a “little more action” is required of counsel, and this is simply incorrect, as reviewing the voluminous record and lengthy motions and orders in this case is not a “little action” under any definition. It is an error to allow counsel to remain as Applicant’s counsel, against his wishes and when he retained her, under these circumstances.”

Petitioner contends that through motions to relieve counsel and this Rule 59 (e) Motion, Eleanor Cleary admitted her fraudulent acts and that the court was in error for forcing her to represent Petitioner under such circumstances. Judge Curtis denied attorney Cleary’s 59 (e) motion and Eleanor Cleary filed a Notice of Appeal. Petitioner then filed a Notice of Counsel with the South Carolina Supreme Court, asking the Supreme Court to establish that attorney Cleary was never his attorney or agent of him and that the courts must not consider Petitioner’s fraudulent PCR as the law of his case. This motion was granted by Chief Justice Beatty on April 1, 2020, acknowledging these facts and relieving Attorney Cleary of her fraudulent representation.

However, the Supreme Court still attempted to obtain illegal jurisdiction over Petitioner’s case pursuant to a Notice of Appeal filed by Attorney Cleary, whom the courts knew and acknowledged pursuant to the order granting Petitioner’s motion for Notice of Counsel, that her representation was fraudulent. However, the South Carolina Supreme Court still attempted to force Attorney Cleary’s body of work and the court’s fraudulent acts pursuant to rulings based on Attorney Cleary’s body of work as the law of Petitioner’s case.

On April 13, 2020, Petitioner filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to SCRCP Rule 60 (b), in the Georgetown Court of Common Pleas, pursuant to Fraud Upon the Court, Motion For Immediate Release pursuant to Double Jeopardy, False Imprisonment, and After-Discovered Evidence in General Sessions. Alma White, Clerk of Court refused to file these motions although Petitioner attached the order from the Supreme Court relieving attorney Cleary of her fraudulent representation, thus denying Petitioner access to the courts again.

In December of 2019, Petitioner was able to acquire the missing portions of his first trial transcript of 2012 through Private Investigator, Bennie L. Webb which consisted of the Honorable Judge Baxley’s ruling, which was a judgment of “acquittal”.

On April 21, 2020, Petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Release supported with facts that he was acquitted of the charges for which he was incarcerated in 2012 by Honorable Judge Michael Baxley in a trial in Georgetown County General Sessions, and that his second trial, of 2014 was illegal and, therefore, barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

On April 27, 2020, Petitioner filed a Motion to Show Lack of Jurisdiction and Fraud Upon the Courtin the South Carolina Supreme Court, for the purpose of showing The South Carolina Supreme Court that based on the circumstances in which the Court acknowledges that Attorney Cleary was never legally Petitioner’s lawyer, that the South Carolina Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over his case, and by accepting Attorney Cleary’s Notice of Appeal on behalf of Petitioner’s case, knowing that if it came from a fraudulent, illegal representation, would be participating in the lower court’s fraudulent acts. Therefore, giving The South Carolina Supreme Court an opportunity to protect Petitioner’s rights and correct these grave errors.

However, on June 16, 2020, without any explanation supported by the law, The South Carolina Supreme Court denied these motions, thus, confirming that the Supreme Court has conspired with Eleanor Cleary, Judge Seals, Attorney General Johnny James, and Judge Curtis to commit fraud, forcing fraudulent representation on Petitioner and conspiring to sabotage Petitioner’s case to secure an unlawful conviction and false imprisonment.

United States District Court

Petitioner contends that throughout six years of attempting to appeal his unlawful conviction and despite countless Motions for Discovery including his first trial transcript of 2012, and request to paid attorneys, and court appointed attorneys, Petitioner has never had a complete Rule 5 discovery or case file.

On January 7, 2020, Petitioner filed Writ of Habeas Corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254 in the District Court, raising Double Jeopardy and other issues of constitutional violations, including all issues of the lower court’s fraudulent acts and supported it with clearly established Federal Law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States that under such circumstances when the lower courts impede a Petitioner from exhausting state remedies, and where a defendant is held imprisoned without any jurisdictional authority, he has the right to file a habeas corpus writ. See Terron Dizzley v. Warden Stephan, C/A No. 8:20-CV-00126-SAL. The U.S. District Court filed Petitioner’s habeas corpus on January 13, 2020.

On January 21, 2020, Petitioner amended petition pursuant to his Double Jeopardy issue. On January 27, 2020, Petitioner filed Objections to Magistrates Report and Recommendation to no avail.

On March 28, 2020, Petitioner amended petition with a Motion for Immediate Release and Evidentiary Hearing pursuant to his Double Jeopardy issue.

On April 13, 2020, Petitioner filed a renewed Motion for Immediate Release.

On April 28, 2020, Petitioner filed a Motion to Show Lack of Jurisdiction and Fraud Upon the Court in the lower courts.

On May 4, 2020, Petitioner amended his Motion to Show Lack of Jurisdiction and Fraud Upon the Court and filed letters requesting to know why none of his motions were being responded to by the courts.

On June 18, 2020, Petitioner filed a renewed Motion for Immediate Release Double Jeopardy and Motion for Issuance of Show Cause Order.

On June 23, 2020, Petitioner of filed an amended Motion for Issuance of Show Cause Order. Petitioner contends that although he has a constitutional right to due process, the U.S. District Court is intentionally depriving Petitioner of accessing the Courts, and intentionally and willfully turned a blind eye to the crime committed against him of False Imprisonment.

Petitioner contends that the U.S District Court waited over a year, and on February 2, 2021, adopted the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation from 2020 to dismiss without prejudice to exhaust state remedies. The District Court’s order failed to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52 (a) and the District Court refused to allow Petitioner to file a 59 (e), passing these issues to the Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals. Therefore, the State of South Carolina, for eight years, and counting, has intentionally impeded Petitioner of having any state corrective process of appealing his conviction, resulting in an unjustifiable inordinate delay and false imprisonment.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner filed a Writ of Mandamus to The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in aide of its respective jurisdiction before the final order of the District Court was issued, pursuant to Immediate Release for Double Jeopardy, False Imprisonment, Lack of Trial Jurisdiction to Impose Sentence. See: No. 21-1278. When The District Court issued its final order, Petitioner filed an appeal to The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See No. 21-6329. Petitioner’s Writ of Mandamus was denied on September 8, 2021, and appeal on September 20, 2021, without a ruling on the merits, and both petitions for rehearing was denied without a ruling on the merits, which violates Petitioner’s right to due process.

ARGUMENT 8

ATTORNEY JEREMY A. THOMPSON AND THE SOUTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

DIRECT APPEAL

Appellate Counsel’s decision to withdraw Petitioner’s direct appeal, as a right, without fully investigating his case as to the merits, without an Anders brief, and without advising him of the dangers of withdrawing his direct appeal, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals accepting Appellant counsel’s withdrawal of Petitioner’s direct appeal without filing an Anders Brief, and without conducting their own judicial determination of appeal merit pursuant to appellant counsel’s request to withdraw, was contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court, and denied Petitioner equal protection of laws.

Attorney Jeremy A. Thompson committed a felony offense against me by intentionally misrepresenting the truth to me, with the intent to injury, defraud, and deceive me by inducing me into legal representation of which I paid him $15,000.00 and then conspired with the South Carolina Court of Appeals to withdraw my direct appeal without filing an Anders Brief.

Attorney Jeremy A. Thompson then filed a PCR and abandoned my PCR and refused to return the $15,000.00 paid to him when requested.

STATE STATUTORY AND. CONSTITIONAL LAWS

Attorney Jeremy A. Thompson’s actions not only caused the depravation of my civil rights, but amount to a felony crime in violation of criminal statute S. C. 38-55-540 (A) (3). South Carolina Court of Appeals actions in granting Jeremy A. Thompson’s request to withdraw my direct appeal without an Anders brief also amounted to conspiracy to violate my civil rights which enable Attorney Jeremy A. Thompson to swindle me out of $15,000.00 needed for hiring counsel of choice.

Petitioner contends that the withdrawal of his direct appeal under such circumstances violated his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and 14th Amendment Right to Due Process. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), “The court ruled that it was error for Penson’s attorney to file a certificate of his view of the appeal as meritless and withdrawing as Penson’s counsel without filing an Anders Brief and it was error for the Appellate Court to accept Penson’s attorney’s certificate that he viewed the appeal as meritless and allowing counsel to withdraw without an Anders Brief or making its own determination whether Penson’s attorney’s evaluation of the case was sound. This requirement was plainly stated in Ellis v. U. S., 356 U.S. 674 (1958); it was repeated in Anders v. California, 386, U.S. 738 (1967); and it was reiterated last term in McCoy v Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429 (1988). The courts held that Penson was left completely without representation during the appellate court’s actual decisional process. The court analogized its ruling in this case to its holdings in critical stage cases where counsel was absent at trial. (Citing U.S v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 659 (1984).

The courts held that neither Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), prejudicial review nor the harmless error analysis of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) was appropriate, prejudice was to be assumed. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) “the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan, held that criminal defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel on first appeal as of right.”

These errors not only violate Petitioner’s right to due process, but also amount to a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice and is inconsistent with rudimentary demands of fair procedure. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994).

When a state court allows appellate counsel to withdraw direct appeal as of right without independent judicial determination of appeal merit the defendant is entitled to a fresh appeal without demonstrating that the initial appeal was non-frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988).

FEDERAL STATUTORY AND CONSTITIONAL LAWS

Petitioner contends that in U. S. v. Burnett, 989 F. 2d 100 (1993) 2d Cir.), “The Court of Appeals, Cardamore, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) defense counsel’s Ander Brief was inadequate, and (2) defense counsel was not entitled to award of attorney fees under Criminal Justice Act. Denial of attorney fees under Criminal Justice Act is justified where Anders Brief is, for all practical purposes, worthless.”

Petitioner contends that his case is so strikingly similar both legally and factually to the U. S. v. Burnett, under the equal protection clause, the same treatment must apply. Petitioner contends that his case is more extreme than Burnett because he actually lost $15,000 as a result of retaining Jeremy Thompson in good faith. In Burnett, the court ruled that the CJA was not entitled to pay Burnett’s “ court appointed” attorney fees for inadequate Anders Brief, than even more so, Attorney Jeremy A. Thompson, actions in obtaining $15,000.00 paid to him, when he did not file an Anders Brief at all, and filed a PCR, and then abandoned Petitioner’s PCR. According to clearly established state and federal law, Attorney Jeremy A. Thompson’s actions amounted to felony fraud as the result of swindling Petitioner out of $15,000.00. The South Court of Appeal’s actions in granting Attorney Thompson’s withdrawal of Petitioner’s direct appeal without an Anders Brief amounted to conspiracy to violate Petitioner’s civil rights. See also United States v. Zuluaga, 981 F. 2d. 74, 75, ( 2d. Cir. 1992). Penson v Ohio, supra, U. S. 488 U. S. 75 (1988).

ARGUMENT 9

ATTORNEYS ELEANOR D. CLEARY AND LEAH B. MOODY

Statement of Facts

Fraud Upon the Court

The record proves that in October of 2017 and August of 2018, the Courts conspired with Leah B. Moody and Eleanor Cleary in swindling Petitioner's mother out of $6,500.00 paid to Leah B. Moody and $10,000.00 paid to Eleanor Cleary. Both attorneys obtained fraudulent representation of Petitioner's PCR without his knowledge or informed consent in writing by contacting judges and the Attorney General by telephone, one of which was Judge William H. Seals and Attorney General Johnny James, and, unlawfully, had themselves substituted as Petitioner's Counsel. See Exhibits. Therefore, forcing fraudulent representation on Petitioner, allowing and participating in Attorney Cleary’s sabotaging Petitioner’s PCR.

Petitioner contends that these judges did not have jurisdiction nor legal authority to substitute Eleanor Cleary nor Leah B. Moody as his counsel. Whereas, these substitutions were authorized by “telephone”, where there was never a motion filed with the courts or petition for substitution of counsel placed before Judge Seals which would sufficiently make the substitution of counsel “a case” that would warrant Judge Seals or any judge jurisdiction to authorize substitution of counsel. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S 349 (1978); Dennis v. Sparks,449 U.S. 24 (1980); In re: Murchison, 349 U.S.133 (1955); Carlisle v. U.S., 517 U.S. 416 (1996), “District Court had no authority to enter post-verdict judgment of acquittal for drug conspiracy where defendants motion for judgment of acquittal was untimely.” Ness v. Eckerd Corp., 350 S.C. 399 (2002),“Trial judge lacked jurisdiction to vacate order that denied corporation’s motion to set aside a default judgment, where modification was not made pursuant to a motion to alter or amend court’s decision, but on judge's own initiative, and modification was more than 10 days after initial order.”

In South Carolina substitution of counsel “must” be granted with strict adherence to SCRCP Rule 11 (b) in a court proceeding and all parties must be notified and present and substitution of counsel cannot be granted Nunc pro tunc or by ex parte proceedings. See ExParte Strom, 539 S.E. 2d 699 (2000); Culbertson v. Clemens, 322 S.C. 20, 25 (1996);

Petitioner contends that PCR Judge, Judge Curtis, did not have jurisdiction to affirm Judge Seals’ illegal substitution of Eleanor Cleary and force fraudulent representation on him, and did not have jurisdiction to rule on any briefs submitted by Eleanor Cleary or Attorney General Johnny James in response to any briefs by Eleanor Cleary. As a result of Eleanor Cleary’s illegal representation, Petitioner was impeded from raising any issues during his PCR and also resulted in Petitioner being without counsel during his PCR. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the PCR court was lost, therefore, any ruling by Judge Curtis is void pursuant to Petitioner’s PCR. See: Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); “If the accused is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the jurisdiction of the court is lost, the judgment of conviction pronounced by the court is void, and release from imprisonment may be obtained by habeas corpus.” Massey v Moore, 348 U. S. 105 (1954), “The Supreme Court held that the prisoner had not had any hearing on the issue whether he had been insane at the time of trial except a hearing before the Federal District Court at a time when that court erroneously believed the prisoner had been represented by counsel at the time of trial the prisoner had not had the hearing to which he was entitled.”

Petitioner contends that the SC Supreme Court, who was aware of these fraudulent acts, had no jurisdiction to except a Notice of Appeal from Eleanor Cleary whom the SC Supreme Court knew was not legally Petitioner’s lawyer and to force Attorney Cleary’s fraudulent representation and her fraudulent body of work on him as the law of his case, and attempt to force Petitioner to appeal issues he did not raise or give consent to raise.

The S.C. State Courts participation in illegally authorizing Leah B. Moody and Eleanor D. Cleary’s illegal representations, forcing their illegal representations on Petitioner, refusing to relieve them of their illegal representations, and refusing to compel them to return the money, at a total of $16,500, illegally obtained, which was meant for Petitioner’s “counsel of choice”, pursuant to countless motions filed. According to clearly established federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, constitutes an unconstitutional restraint on Petitioner’s assets, which violates his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Right to “counsel of choice” which forced Petitioner to represent himself throughout eight years of appealing his unlawful conviction. See: Louis v U. S., 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016), “ The Supreme Court, Justice Breyer, held that pretrial restraints on defendant’s legitimate assets needed to obtain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel grants a defendant “ a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 53 (1932), that he “can afford to hire”, Caplin & Drysdal Chartered v. United States, 491 U .S. 617 (1989). “The Court has consistently referred to the right to counsel of choice as “fundamental”. “The right to select counsel of choice” is just, “the root of meaning” of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel. U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 - 148 (2006).”

In Wainwright v. Torna, 45 U.S. 586 (1982), it was suggested that in proceedings as to which there is no right to appointed counsel, the defendant may have a Constitutionally protected interest in being represented by retained counsel and the state, therefore, cannot preclude such representation absent a compelling justification.

Petitioner contends that he also had a constitutional right to be "conflict free” as to choice of “retained” counsel and not have fraudulent representation forced upon him. Wood v. Georgia, 400 U.S. 261 (1981); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.335 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Bonin v. California, 494 U.S. 1039 (1990).

Petitioner contends that on April 13, 2020, he filed a Rule 60 (b) Motion to Set Aside Judgment of his PCR due to “Fraud Upon the Court”, and the Clerk of Court of Georgetown County refused to file Petitioner’s motion, thus participating in the state’s fraudulent acts. Clerk of Court Alma Y. White of Georgetown, SC has been depriving Petitioner of accessing the courts for eight years.

Petitioner contends that appealing the judgment of his PCR as to issues briefed and raised by Eleanor Cleary, as the law of his case, would force Petitioner to participate in the illegal and fraudulent acts of Eleanor Cleary and the State Courts, therefore, sabotaging his own case and placing him at default from raising his issues in federal court.

On December 9, 2019, Eleanor Cleary admitted to her fraudulent acts of obtaining illegal representation, that the court was in error for forcing her to continue to represent Petitioner, under such circumstances, and that these errors impeded Petitioner from raising his “strong and meritorious” PCR issues, when she filed a Rule 59 (e) Motion for Reconsideration of the Denial of Post-Conviction Relief. See: Page 5, paragraph 7 which states:

“Finally, Counsel asked this court to address the motion to be relieved in a separate order so that she would not be forced to argue it in conjunction with the strong and meritorious post-conviction relief claims that Applicant has.” However, this Court declined to do so. Counsel must, therefore, reiterate that because Applicant is currently suing counsel in Richland County Court of Common Pleas for monetary damages, for which counsel has had to retain counsel to represent her, and which is ongoing, she has a conflict of interest. This Court mistakenly asserts that only a “little more action” is required of counsel, and this is simply incorrect, as reviewing the voluminous record and lengthy motions and orders in this case is not a “little action” under any definition. It is an error to allow counsel to remain as Applicant’s counsel, against his wishes and when he retained her, under these circumstances.”

U. S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878), “Where unsuccessful party has been prevented from fully exhibiting his case, by fraud or deception, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of compromise, or keeping him in ignorance of the suit; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client’s interest; and in similar cases where there has never been a real contest, new suit may be maintained to set aside and annul judgment or decree.”

Petitioner contends that he has demonstrated corruption and fraud upon the court involving lawyers he has retained, court appointed lawyers, judges, The Attorney General, and lawyers illegally substituted as Petitioner’s counsel, without his consent, after swindling his mother out of substantial amounts of money meant for Petitioner to obtain counsel of choice.

Petitioner has demonstrated that these government officials and lawyers have intentionally impeded Petitioner from exhausting any state remedies in the Appellate Court, Court of Common Pleas, and The SC Supreme Court. Due to these extraordinary circumstances Petitioner’s due process rights have been gravely violated and he should not be required to exhaust state remedies which the state intentionally failed to make available to him after eight years. See: Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), “Existence of cause for procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel‘s efforts to comply with state’s procedural rule. Showing that actual or legal basis for the claim was not reasonably available to counsel, or that some of the interference by officials made compliance with state’s procedural rule impracticable, would constitute cause for procedural default. In extraordinary case, where constitutional violation has probably resulted in conviction of one who is actually innocent, federal habeas court may grant writ even absence of showing cause for procedural default”, Maples v Thomas, 565 U. S. 266 (2012), “For purposes of determining whether a habeas Petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim, under agency principles, the client cannot be charged with acts or omissions of an attorney who has abandoned him, and neither can a client be faulted for failing to act on his own behalf when he lacks reason to believe his attorneys of record, in fact, are not representing him.” Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012),“The rules for when the prisoner may establish cause to excuse a procedural default reflect an equitable judgment that only where the prisoner is impeded or obstructed in complying with the state’s established procedures will a federal habeas court excuse the prisoner from the usual sanction of the default. Trevino v. Thaler, 596 U.S. 413 (2013); Ex Parte Hawk, supra 321 U.S. 114 (1944); Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988).

ELEANOR CLEARY AND LEAH B. MOODY

STATE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS

Leah B. Moody’s fraudulent acts of obtaining representation and swindling Petitioner’s mother out of $6,500.00 which was meant for Petitioner’s counsel of choice , amounted to criminal acts in violation of SC Code ₴ 38-55-540 (A), (2), “Criminal Penalties or making false statements or misrepresentations, or assisting, abetting, soliciting or conspiring to do so, restitution to victims.

Eleanor Cleary’s fraudulent acts of obtaining representation and swindling Petitioner’s mother out of $10,000.00 which was meant for Petitioner’s counsel of choice , amounted to criminal acts in violation of SC Code ₴ 38-55-540 (A), (3) which is a felony.

FEDERAL STATUTORY AND CONSTITIONAL LAWS

Once Leah B. Moody and Eleanor Cleary obtained illegal representation for my PCR, both of them starting filing motions illegally pursuant to my case and mailing them to the courts and to the attorney general thus, using the mail to further carry out her scheme to defraud the courts, my mother and me. According to clearly established law, this is also mail fraud and violates, 18 U.S.C.A.₴ 1341, “Fraud and Swindles” See: U.S. v Stochel 901 F. 3d 883 (2018); See also: 18 U.S.C A. ₴ 1349, “Attempt and Conspiracy”; 18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1001 “Statements or Entry General."

Leah B. Moody and Eleanor acted under color of state law and conspired with government officials to fraudulently obtain representation of my PCR, Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984); FSG ₴ 2c 1.1 “Offering, Giving, Soliciting, or Receiving a Bribe; Extortion Under Color of Official Rights; Fraud Involving the Deprivation of Intangible Rights to Honest Service of Public Officials; Conspiracy to Defraud by Interference with Government Transactions 18 USCA 3802, “False Claims and Statements; Liability”; 20 USCA 1097 ₴, “Criminal Penalties; FSG ₴ 2J 1.2, “Obstruction of Justice”; 18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 241, (Conspiracy Against Rights); 242, (Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law); 42 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1985 “Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights”; ₴ 1986, “Action for Neglect to Prevent; ₴ 1988, ‘Proceeds and Vindication of Civil Rights. See: U.S. v Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); U. S. v Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); U. S. v Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997); U. S. v Moore, 708 F. 3d 639 (2013).

AURGUMENT 10

JUDGE WILLIAMS H. SEALS

STATE, STATUTORY AND CONSTITIONAL LAWS

Judge William H. Seals committed felony fraud in violation of statute 38-55-540 (A), (2); Section 16-17-410. When he conspired with Eleanor Cleary who swindled Petitioner and his Mother out of $10,000 along with Attorney General Johnny James and unlawfully substituted Eleanor Cleary as my counsel in my PCR without my knowledge or informed consent in writing over the telephone.

FEDERAL, STATUTORY AND CONSTITIONAL LAWS

18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 241, (Conspiracy Against Rights); 242, (Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law); 42 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1985, “Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights”; ₴ 1986, “Action for Neglect to Prevent; ₴ 1988, ‘Proceeds and Vindication of Civil Rights.

AURGUMENT 11

ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHNNY JAMES

STATE, STATUTORY AND CONSTITIONAL LAWS

Attorney General Johnny James committed felony fraud in violation of statute 38-55- 540 (A), (2); Section 16-17-410. When he conspired with Eleanor Cleary and Judge Williams H. Seals and unlawfully substituted Eleanor Cleary as my counsel in my PCR without my knowledge or informed consent in writing over the telephone.

Attorney General Johnny James unlawful actions deprived me of fully and fairly presenting my case in my PCR and obstructed the administration of justice in the court in violation of ₴ 16-9-340. Although Attorney General Johnny knew that Eleanor Cleary was not legally Terron’s lawyer, he continued to file briefs in response to Eleanor Cleary and provided false information on court documents that Eleanor Cleary was Terron’s lawyer which is felony perjury, violating ₴ 16-9-10 (A), (2).

FEDERAL STATUTORY AND CONSTITIONAL LAWS

Although Attorney General Johnny James knew that Eleanor Cleary’s representation was unlawful and despite countless of motions from Terron and Eleanor Cleary to relieve Eleanor Cleary of her unlawful representation, and civil action filed against Eleanor Cleary by Terron, in which a copy of all of these motions and civil actions were sent to Attorney General Johnny James. Despite this, Attorney General Johnny James continued to file briefs in response to Eleanor Cleary’s briefs and placing Eleanor Cleary’s name on his briefs as Terron’s counsel, although he knew that she was not lawfully his counsel. Attorney General Johnny James did mail these briefs to the Clerk of Court and Eleanor Cleary, thus, using the mail in furtherance to carry out his scheme to defraud the courts, my mother and me. According to clearly established law, this is also mail fraud and violates, 18 U.S.C.A.₴ 1341, “Fraud and Swindles” See: U.S. v. Stochel 901 F. 3d 883 (2018); See also: 18 U.S.C A. ₴ 1349, “Attempt and Conspiracy”; 18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1001 “Statements or Entry General."

JUDGE KRISTI CURTIS

STATE, STATUTORY AND CONSTITIONAL LAWS

Judge Kristi Curtis committed felony fraud in violation of ₴ 38-55-540 (A),(2); ₴ 16-17- 410. When she willfully turned a blind eye to Eleanor Cleary, Judge William H. Seals and Attorney General Johnny James unlawful substitution of Eleanor Cleary as Terron’s counsel despite several motions by Eleanor Cleary and Terron to relieve Eleanor Cleary of unlawful representation and civil actions filed against Eleanor Cleary. The record proves that despite this Judge Curtis still condoned, authorized, and forced Eleanor Cleary to illegally represent Terron in his PCR. Judge Curtis’ action prevented Terron from fully and fairly presenting his case in his PCR, which amounted to obstruction of the administration of justice in the court, in violation of ₴ 16-9-340. Judge Curtis issued court orders and willfully provided false information that Eleanor Cleary was Terron’s attorney, although she knew that she was not legally his lawyer; therefore, committing felony perjury in violation of ₴ 16-9-10 (A), (2). When Judge Curtis iissued these orders through the mail to the Attorney General, The Clerk of Court and Eleanor Cleary, this amounted to a federal offense of mail fraud, therefore, using the mail in furtherance to defraud the courts and me which violates 18 U.S.C. ₴ 1341, “Swindles and Frauds”.

FEDERAL STATUTORY AND CONSTITIONAL LAWS

18 U.S.C.A.₴ 1341, “Fraud and Swindles” See: U.S. v Stochel 901 F. 3d 883 (2018); See also: 18 U.S.C A. ₴ 1349, “Attempt and Conspiracy”; 18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1001 “Statements or Entry General”.

FSG ₴ 2c 1.1 “Offering, Giving, Soliciting, or Receiving a Bribe; Extortion Under Color of Official Rights; Fraud Involving the Deprivation of Intangible Rights to Honest Service of Public Officials; Conspiracy to Defraud by Interference with Government Transactions 18 USCA 3802, “False Claims and Statements; Liability”; 20 USCA 1097 ₴, “Criminal Penalties; FSG ₴ 2J 1.2, “Obstruction of Justice”; 18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1985, “Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights”; ₴ 1986, “Action for Neglect to Prevent; ₴ 1988, ‘Proceeds and Vindication of Civil Rights. See: U.S. v Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); U. S. v Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); U. S. v Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997); U. S. v Moore, 708 F. 3d 639 (2013).

ARGUMENT 13

CHIEF JUSTICE, BEATTY OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT

STATE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS

The record shows that on April 21, 2020, Petitioner filed a motion for Immediate Release pursuant to false imprisonment, double jeopardy, lack of trial jurisdiction to impose sentence in the South Carolina Supreme Court. Petitioner provided a copy of the Honorable Judge Michael Baxley’s ruling of 2012 and clearly established US Supreme Court law which proves that he was acquitted of the charges of which he is falsely imprisoned, and that double jeopardy barred his second trial of 2014, and that such unlawful conviction is false imprisonment and that he SC Department has no legal authority to hold him in prison and that he must be immediately discharged. Chief Justice Beatty denied Petitioner’s motion without any explanation supported by law which complied with the requirements of SCRPC, Rule 52(a) and refused to respond to Petitioner’s 59(e) Motion. Chief Justice Beatty’s actions of turning a “blind eye” to my false imprisonment resulted in kidnapping and false imprisonment. S.C. Code 1976 ₴ 16-3-910, “Kidnapping”. See Also, 16-3-920, “ Conspiracy to Kidnap”, which is also defined as “false imprisonment: See State v. Berntsen, 295 S. C. 51 (1988); S.C. ₴ 3, “Privileges and Immunities”,

Due Process and Equal Protection of Laws.

The records shows that despite of motions to Chief Beatty, he also turned a blind eye to Leah B. Moody, Eleanor Cleary, Judge H. Seals, Attorney General Johnny James and Judge Kristi Curtis’ fraudulent and criminal acts and condoned, authorized, and participated in these fraudulent acts by accepting a Notice of Appeals from Eleanor Cleary as to my PCR, although Chief Justice Beatty knew and acknowledged that Eleanor Cleary was not legally my lawyer in his response to my Motion of Notice of Counsel and Eleanor Cleary’s Motion to Relief Counsel. However, Chief Justice Beatty forced Eleanor’s unlawfully representation on me without jurisdiction and attempted to force me to appeals Eleanor Cleary’s fraudulent body of work as the law of my case which resulted is conspiracy to commit felony fraud. See SC Code ₴ 16, 17, 14 in violation of ₴ 38-55-540. Thus, also amounting to obstruction of justice which deprived me of my appeal and obstructed the administration of justice in the court.

When Chief Justice Beatty issued orders on court documents placing Eleanor Cleary as my lawyer, knowing that she was not legally my lawyer, such unlawful acts amounted to felony perjury, in violation of ₴ 16-9-10A (2). When Chief Justice Beatty placed these orders in the mail to be sent to Eleanor Cleary, Attorney General and the Clerk of Court, Chief Justice Beatty used the mail to further carry out his scheme to conspire to defraud the Courts and me which is a federal mail fraud and violates, 18 U.S.C.A.₴ 1341, “Frauds and Swindles”.

FEDERAL STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS

Amend. 5, U. S. Const.; Amend. 14 U. S. Const., “Due Process, Equal Protection of Laws”; Amend. 13 U. S. Const., “Right to Be Free From Slavery”; 18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1201, “Kidnapping”; 18 U.S. C.A. 241(Conspiracy Against Rights); 242, (Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law); 42 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1985, “Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights”; ₴ 1986, “Action for Neglect to Prevent; ₴ 1988, ‘Proceeds and Vindication of Civil Rights.

ARGUMENT 14

ALMA WHITE, CLERK OF COURT OF GEORGETOWN COUNTY, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW

I am exercising my First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to press charges against Alma Y. White, Clerk of Court of Georgetown County on the grounds that for 8 years and counting, Georgetown County Clerk of Court, Alma Y. White, has committed the following crimes against me by refusing to file any of my motions for relief to appeal my illegal incarceration, false imprisonment, and kidnapping.

MOTIONS FILED AND NEVER PROCESSED BY ALMA Y. WHITE

1. December 27, 2016 – 2020 – “Motion for New-Trial After-Discovered Evidence”, “Brady Violation”, Filed in General Sessions pursuant to Rule 29 (b) SCRCim. P. A copy of this motion was also filed with The Honorable Judge Benjamin H. Culbertson, Chief Administrative Judge of Georgetown County.

2. 2017, “Motion to Relieve Counsel”, of Leah B. Moody for Fraudulent Representation.

3. 2018, “Motion to Relieve Counsel”, “Writ of Mandamus”, to Relieve Eleanor Cleary of Fraudulent Representation.

4. April 13, 2020, refiled “Motion for a New Trial After-Discovered Evidence”, Motion for Immediate Relief, Double Jeopardy, False Imprisonment, Lack of Jurisdiction to Impose Sentence”, “Motion for Relief from Judgment of PCR pursuant to Fraud Upon the Court, Rule 60 (b)”, “Motion for a New Trial Insufficient Evidence to Support Verdict”. These motions were refiled on May 18, 2020.

5. October 28, 2021, refiled “Emergency Exparte Motions for Immediate Release, Double Jeopardy, False Imprisonment, Lack of Trial Court’s Jurisdiction to Impose Sentence.” This motion was filed by Terron Gerhard Dizzley, Gwendolyn B. Frasier and LaQuesha Felder. A copy of this motion was also filed with The Honorable Judge Steven John and Benjamin H. Culbertson, Chief Administrative Judges of Georgetown County.

Alma Y. White’s, Clerk of Court of Georgetown County, unlawful actions of denying me access to the Courts, for eight years and counting, resulted in criminal acts of “obstruction of justice”, which is a felony, in violation of S.C. Code ₴ 16-9-340 (A), (1), (2), (B). State v. Lyles-Gray, 328 S.C. 458 (1997), “Defendant, a police officer, was convicted after jury trial in Circuit Court, of common-law obstruction of justice and official misconduct in office, in connection with her handling of shoplifting case in which her child was a suspect. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: although statue ₴ 16-9-340 governing intimidation of court official codifies various common-law crimes, it does not purport to codify or supersede all of them. Although persons can commit obstruction of justice by use of force or threats, such conduct is neither essential element of nor only means of committing, crime of common-law obstruction of justice. Under common-law obstruction of justice, it is an offense to do any act which prevents, obstructs, impedes or hinders the administration of justice. Misconduct in office occurs when persons in public office fail to properly and faithfully discharge duty imposed by law. State v. Love, 275 S.C. 55 (1980), “Former magistrate’s procurement of invalid driver’s license for an individual and promise to fix traffic records and “fix the prosecution” against the individual for $5,500.00 was sufficient evidence to establish obstruction of justice.” State v. Cogdell, 273 S.C. 563, 567 (1979), “Holding that the intentional failure of a responsible public official to report convictions of traffic violations so as to interrupt or prevent the mandated suspension of a motorist’s drivers license is an obstruction of justice and punishable at common-law.” State v. DeWitt, 20 S.C.L. ( 2 Hill) 282 (1934), “Fabrication of evidence sufficient to establish common-law obstruction of justice.”

Alma Y. White’s unlawful actions resulting in criminal acts of “Conspiracy to Kidnapping” in violation of ₴ 16-3-920. Whereas the record and evidence show that I am being held in the South Carolina Department of Corrections without any legal authority and depriving me of my right to access the courts to obtain my freedom is “willful blindness”, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy to keep me falsely imprisoned to cover-up the illegal actions of other government officials. Global- Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S. A. 563 U.S. 754 (2011), “ A willfully blind defendant is one who take deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing who can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts.” McMurry v. Sheahan, 927 F. Supp. 1082 (1996). See also: ₴ 16 -17- 410, and ₴ 38 – 55 – 540.

In October 2017, Attorney Leah B. Moody, after fraudulently obtaining $6,500.00 from my Mother, Gwendolyn B. Frasier, conspired with the Judge and Attorney General and obtained illegal representation of my PCR without any legal or jurisdictional authority, without my knowledge nor informed consent, in writing, and without any motions for substitution of counsel filed through the Courts. Alma Y. White, Clerk of Court of Georgetown County, illegally placed Leah B. Moody on the court docket as my attorney. Therefore, conspiring with Leah B. Moody and Government officials to commit fraud in violation of ₴ 38 – 55 – 540 (A), (2).

In August 2018, Attorney Eleanor D. Cleary, after fraudulently obtaining $10, 000 from my Mother, Gwendolyn B. Frasier, conspired with Judge Seals and Attorney General, Johnny James, and obtained illegal representation of my PCR without any legal nor jurisdictional authority, without my knowledge nor informed consent, in writing, and without any motions for substitution of counsel filed through the Courts. Alma Y. White, Clerk of Court of Georgetown County, illegally placed Eleanor Cleary on the court docket as my attorney. Therefore, conspiring with Eleanor D. Cleary and Government officials to commit fraud in violation of ₴ 38 -55 - 540 (A), (3) which is a felony.

Alma Y. White’s unlawful actions of placing Leah B. Moody and Eleanor Cleary on the court dockets as my attorneys amounted to perjury which is also a felony in violation of ₴ 16 - 9 - 10  (A).

2). Elliott v. Peirsol’s Lessee, 26 U.S. 328 (1828), “A clerk of a county court has no authority to alter the record of the acknowledgement of a deed at any time after a record is made. A judgement rendered by a court which does not have jurisdiction constitutes no justification and all persons concerned in executing such judgment are considered in law trespassers.”

Alma Y. White, did, for eight years and counting, has obstructed justice by impeding me from accessing the courts. Therefore, obstructing and impeding the administration of justice in the court.

Petitioner contends that Clerk of Court, Alma White’s actions also resulted in “mail fraud.” The record shows that Clerk of Court, Alma White, without any motion for substation of counsel, or any documentation of Petitioner’s informed consent, in writing, consenting to any substitution of counsel for Attorneys Leah B. Moody nor Eleanor D. Cleary. Clerk of Court, Alma Y. White unlawfully placed Attorneys Leah B. Moody and Eleanor D. Cleary on the court docket as Petitioner’s counsel and refused to file any of Petitioner’s motions to relieve these attorneys of their fraudulent representation. Alma White then began filing motions for Leah B. Moody and Eleanor Cleary on behalf of Petitioner’s case, mailing them to the Attorney General, the judges, Petitioner, and also filing motions for The Attorney General and the Judges on behalf of motions and briefs filed in response to Leah B. Moody and Eleanor Cleary’s fraudulent representation. Therefore, using the U.S. Mail to further carry out her fraudulent acts to defraud the courts and Petitioner which is a felony crime. See: 18 U.S.C A. ₴ 1341, “Fraud and Swindles”. See: U. S. v Stochel, 901 F. 3d. 883 (2018).

ARGUMENT 15

JEANETTE W. McBRIDE, CLERK of COURT OF RICHLAND COUNTY, JUDGE ROBERT E. HOOD, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF RICHLAND COUNTY

Jeanette W. McBride did violate my first and Fourteenth Amendment rights to access the court and due process which amounted to obstruction of justice and conspiracy to kidnapping and false imprisonment. Judge Robert E. Hood did commit the crimes of “willful blindness” and conspiracy to false imprisonment against me by willfully turning a blind eye to my motions filed which proved my false imprisonment and refusing to take the appropriate measures to make sure that my case was filed and adjudicated.

On March 2, March 22, and April 3, 2021, Petitioner filed a “Motion for Change of Venue, Motion to Expedite Virtual Hearing”, and an “Emergency Motion for Immediate Release, Double Jeopardy, False Imprisonment, Lack of Trial Court Jurisdiction to Impose Sentence” in the Court of Common Pleas in Richland County, Columbia, SC. Petitioner also sent a copy of these motions to Administrative Judge, Robert E. Hood.

In these motions, Petitioner explained that he is and has been falsely imprisoned, kidnapped for over seven years, and counting, without any legal nor jurisdictional authority.

Petitioner also explained that he had attempted to file these motions in Georgetown County, and Clerk of Court, Alma Y. White, refuses to file these motions, thus, depriving him of accessing the courts and has been doing this for the entire time of his illegal incarceration. Petitioner explained that this is the reason that he was requesting a change of venue to protect his First and Fourteenth Rights to Due Process to have an opportunity to be heard and obtain relief from his false imprisonment.

 However, Jeanette W. McBride refused to file Petitioner’s motions on three different occasions, and Judge Robert E. Hood, responded al that Richland County did not have jurisdiction over the case. Thus, also violating Petitioner’s right to access the courts, and willfully turning a blind eye to the crimes of kidnapping and false imprisonment. Whereas, such acts of willful blindness is also a crime.

On September 10, 2021, Petitioner filed an “Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus” in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas requesting that Court issue an order that Jeanette W. McBride from violating Petitioner’s First and Fourteenth Rights and to instruct Clerk of Court, Jeanette McBride to cease from violating his First and Fourth Amendment Rights to access the courts, and to instruct Clerk, Jeanette McBride to file Petitioner’s motions. It is clearly established that change of venue is proper in the interests of liberty and justice. Ervin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). It also clearly established that a court’s subject matter jurisdiction is not determined by geographical standards, but by whether it has the authority to hear the type of case in question. The question of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law for the court and cannot be determined until that court obtains jurisdiction. Baddourah v. McMaster, 433 S. C. 89 (2001).

I am exercising my constitutional rights to press charges on Clerk of Court, Alma Y. White, for the crimes that she committed against me which are listed in this complaint. I am also requesting that the Inspector General assist me in filing restraining orders against Alma Y. White, the Clerk of Court of Georgetown County and Jeanette McBride, Clerk of Court of Richland County and make sure that these restraining orders are enforced, and that they cease from committing these criminal acts against me, and that Alma White, Clerk of Court of Georgetown immediately schedule an Emergency Hearing pursuant to the procedures set forth in S. C. Code ₴ 20-4-50 which requires an Emergency Hearing within 24 hours of filing pursuant to our October 28, 2021 “Emergency Exparte Motion for Immediate Release, Double Jeopardy, False Imprisonment, Lack of Trial Court’s Jurisdiction to Impose Sentence”. See: SC Code ₴ 20-4-50, More v. More 376 S. C. 467 (2008); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth 408 U. S. 564 (1972). “Requirements of Procedural Due Process apply only to deprivation of interest encompassed by Fourteenth Amendment Protection of Liberty and Property, and when protected interests are indicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount.”

It is indisputable that I have a First and Fourteenth Right to access the courts, and these rights are grounded in reliance on The Clerks of Court to perform their ministerial duties. Barnes v. State, 433 S. C. 399 (2001), “Clerks of Court have a ministerial duty to docket filings irrespective of potential procedural flaws that may exist. S. C. Code Ann. ₴ 17-27-40. Unless specifically authorized by statute or court rule, a Clerk of Court may not exercise any judicial power reserved for a judge; this includes the prohibition of performing any action contingent on deciding a question of law.” McCray v. Maryland, 456 F. 2d 1 (1972 4th), “The Court of Appeals held that state prisoner was entitled to damages as a result of state court clerk’s negligence which impeded the filing of papers sufficiently alleged that prisoner was barred access to courts, was denied constitutional rights and stated a claim for which relief could be given under the civil rights statue.” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971), “Access to the courts is protected by the Due Process Clause.” Chambers v.Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 207 U.S. 142 (1907), “Access to the courts is a privilege of American Citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508 (1972), “Access to the Courts is “part of the right to petition protected by the First Amendment.”

ARGUMENT 16

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA –

MAGISTRATES, JUDGES, JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, JOSEPH DAWSON, III, SHERRI LYDON, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, CIRCUIT JUDGES - KING, THACKER, TRAXLER, RICHARDSON, GREGORY, AGEE, SHEDD

Terron Dizzley v Warden Stephan, C/A No. 8:20-CV-00126-SAL

The record shows that the Petitioner provided the U. S. District Court and the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit with proof that for over six years, the lower courts deprived him of his direct appeal, PCR, and discovery, mostly importantly, his 2012 first trial transcript, upon countless of requests through Pro Se motions, paid attorneys, court appointed attorneys, and private investigators.

In December of 2019, Petitioner was finally able to obtain his first trial transcript through the third hired Private Investigator, Bennie L. Webb. Petitioner contends that once he received his first trial transcript of 2012 which proves that he was acquitted of the crimes of which he was falsely imprisoned. Petitioner immediately filed a petition for a writ of habeas on January 7, 2020, requesting his immediate release pursuant to Double Jeopardy, False Imprisonment, Lack Trial Court Jurisdiction to Impose Sentence.

Although, it is clearly established that The United States Supreme Court laws have determined that when a person is confined illegally, in contrary of the Constitution or fundamental law, habeas corpus is the proper remedy regardless of exhaustion of state remedies, even though imposed pursuant to conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973), “Essence of “Habeas Corpus” is attacked by person in custody upon legality of that custody, and traditional function of the writ is to secure immediate relief from illegal custody. Requiring exhaustion before allowing state prisoners access to federal courts to attack validity of fact or length of their confinement means that prisoner’s state remedy must be adequate and available. The original view of habeas corpus attack upon detention under a judicial order “ was” a limited one. The relevant inquiry “ was” confined to determining simply whether or not the committing court had possessed jurisdiction. Eg., Exparte Kearney, 7 Wheat.38 (1822); Exparte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193 (1830). But, over the years, the writ of habeas evolved as a remedy available to effect discharge from any confinement contrary to the Constitution or fundamental law, even though imposed pursuant to conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction. See: Exparte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874); Exparte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1880); Exparte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417 (1885); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938); and Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942). See also. Fay v. Noia, Supra, at 405 – 409 of 372 U. S., 83 S. Ct. at 830 – 832 and cited at 409 n. 17, 83 S. Ct. at 832. Exparte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 (1886).”

Although according to United Supreme Court Law, The District Court has jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s habeas corpus for immediate release from his unlawful, unconstitutional incarceration, and under such circumstances, an evidentiary hearing must be held. Townsend v. Sain, 83 S. Ct. 745 (1963). However, Magistrate Jacquelyn D. Austin issued a Report of Recommendation on January 13, 2020, which was erroneous and contrary to United States Supreme Law that it did not have jurisdiction over Petitioner’s case because he allegedly did not exhaust state remedies and dismissed Petitioner’s habeas without prejudice and without ruling on the merits of his case. Petitioner filed Objections on January 27, 2020, and The District Court waited an entire year, and on February 2, 2021, Judge Joseph Dawson, III adopted Judge Austin’s Report of Recommendations from the 2020, without responding to Petitioner’s Objections, which did not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 (a) , and refused to allow Petitioner to file a 59 (e). The District Court’s ruling was erroneous and contrary to United States Supreme Court Law. Braden v 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U. S. 484 (1973).

“Exhaustion of State Remedies Doctrine is a judicially crafted instrument which reflects a careful balance between interests of federalism and need to preserve writ of habeas corpus as a swift and imperative remedy in cases of illegal restraint or confinement and doctrine cannot be used to shatter attempt at litigation of constitutional claims without regard to purposes that underlie doctrine and that called it into existence. Under habeas corpus statute, so long as custodian can be reached by service of process, court can issue a writ within its jurisdiction requiring that prisoners be brought before court for hearing on his claim, or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if prisoner himself is confined outside court’s territorial jurisdiction.” See: Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946), “Action against FBI officers for damages for illegal arrest, false imprisonment, and unlawful searches and seizures of property belonging to plaintiffs. A judgement dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and plaintiff brings certiorari. Reversed. It is estimated practice for the Supreme Court to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution and to restrain individual state officers from doing what the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the state to do. Where federally protected rights have been invaded, courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief, and federal courts may use “any” available remedy to make good the wrong done.” Preiser, supra, 411 U.S. 475, (1973). Canter v American and Ocean Insp. Cos. of New York, 27 U.S. 554 (1829), “When the record shows that an appeal was regularly taken, the case must be heard on its merits, and motion to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction in the court below cannot be entertained in the appellate court.” Will v Calvert Fire Insp. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978), “Where district court persistently and without reason refuses to adjudicate a case properly before it, the Court of Appeals may issue a writ of mandamus in order that it may exercise its appellate jurisdiction.”

Petitioner filed a Writ of Mandamus for Emergency Petition for Immediate Release, Double Jeopardy, False Imprisonment, Lack of Trial Court’s Jurisdiction to Impose Sentence in The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in aide its respective jurisdiction. See: In re Terron Dizzley, 850 Fed. Appx. 853 (2021). Circuit Judge King, Thacker and Traxler denied Petitioner’s Writ of Mandamus without ruling on the merits of his case.

Petitioner appealed the final order from The District Court’s ruling. See: Terron Dizzley v. Warden Stephon, 858 Fed. Appx. 674 (2021). On September 20, 2021, Circuit Judges Thacker, Richardson, and Traxler also denied his appeal without ruling on the merits of his case.

Petitioner contends that The District Court and The United States Court of Appeals rulings under such circumstances, whereas Petitioner is falsely imprisoned without any legal nor jurisdictional authority for eight years and counting, and the courts persistently refuses to adjudicate his case amounts to a “usurpation of judicial power” and a clear abuse of discretion, and also resulted in criminal acts of willful blindness to false imprisonment and conspiracy to false imprisonment which violated my civil rights. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S. A. 563 U.S. 754 (2011), “ A willfully blind defendant is one who take deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing who can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts.” McMurry v. Sheahan, 927 F. Supp. 1082 (1996). See also ₴ 16 -17- 410, and ₴ 38 – 55 – 540.

STATE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS

S.C. Code 1976 ₴ 16-3-910, “Kidnapping”. See Also, 16-3-920, “ Conspiracy to Kidnap”, which is also defined as “false imprisonment: See State v. Berntsen, 295 S. C. 51 (1988); S.C. Constitution, Art. I, ₴ 12, “Double Jeopardy”; ₴ 3, “Privileges and Immunities”.

FEDERAL STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS

Amend. 5, U. S. Const. “Double Jeopardy”; Amend. 14 U. S. Const., “Due Process, Equal Protection of Laws”; Amend. 13 U. S. Const., “Right to Be Free from Slavery”; 18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1201, “Kidnapping”; 18 U.S.C.A. ₴ 241, (Conspiracy Against Rights); 242, (Deprivation of R i g h t s Under Color of Law); 42 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1985, “Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights”; ₴ 1986 “Action for Neglect to Prevent; ₴ 1988, ‘Proceeds and Vindication of Civil Rights. See: U. S. v Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); U. S. v Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); U. S. v Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997); U. S. v Moore, 708 F. 3d 639 (2013).

AUGUMENT 17

United States District Court of South Carolina Magistrate Judges, Jacquelyn D. Austin, Sherri A. Lydon, and United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Judges Gregory, Agee, and Shedd

Terron Dizzley v Scott Hixon, et al, 2:20- CV-02613-JDA

In 2020, I, Terron Dizzley, filed a 1983 Civil Action against the Georgetown County Solicitor’s Office, against Solicitors Scott Hixon, Ervin Bailey, and Gregory Hembree in their individual and official capacities for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. This action was also filed against The South Carolina Department of Correction for false imprisonment, and countless other government officials who conspired in my false imprisonment. See: Dizzley v. Hixon, 2020 WL9211156. See also: 2021 WL4936254.

Despite the fact that Petitioner provided clear and indisputable evidence supported by U. S. Supreme law which establishes that he was acquitted of the charges that he is falsely imprisoned in his first trial of 2012 pursuant to a ruling from The Honorable Judge Michael Baxley who discharged his jury on the grounds that the State failed to meet their “burden of proof “to the extent that they could bring back a unanimous verdict. According to U.S. Supreme Court law, such ruling was an “acquittal”. Double Jeopardy barred retrial and, therefore, my 1983 Civil Action for malicious prosecution is not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994).

Petitioner contends that the record proves that Judge Jacquelyn D. Austin intentionally misrepresented the facts as to the record of Petitioner’s case and applied incorrect laws. The record proves that in Judge Austin’s order she started out by acknowledging that Petitioner argued that he was falsely imprisoned pursuant to an unlawful conviction in violation of the 5th Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause because he was acquitted of the charges of which he is falsely imprisoned for in his first trial of 2012 , when the Honorable Judge Michael Baxley stopped jury deliberations and discharged his jury on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to convict him for the crime of murder.

Judge Austin then later in her order intentionally misstates the facts as to the record of Petitioner’s argument and the trial record and now alleges that Petitioner argued that he was acquitted by a jury verdict of not guilty and that Judge Baxley declared a mistrial because the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict, and, therefore, Petitioner’s second trial was not barred by double jeopardy. However, the record proves that Judge Baxley stated three times in his ruling that his decision to spontaneously declared a mistrial was not based on the fact that the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict, but, that his decision to declare a mistrial was “a strong message to the prosecution that they are unable to meet the “burden of proof “ to the extent that they can bring back a unanimous verdict. “ According to U.S. Supreme Court laws such ruling is a “judgment of acquittal,” despite the label Judge Baxley placed on discharging the jury as a mistrial/hung jury.

It is clearly established by the U. S. Supreme Court that an “acquittal” is a “favorable termination” of a criminal prosecution which invalidates a second trial, judgment, and sentence imposed pursuant to a conviction for the same offense to support a 1983 action for malicious prosecution. See: McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019). “ Under Heck, in order to recovers damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or other harm caused by actions who unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid ₴ 1983 plaintiff first must prove that his conviction had been invalidated in some way; this favorable termination requirement applies whenever a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply that his prior conviction or sentence was invalid. The Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor, held that the statue of limitations for commissioner’s ₴ 1983 fabricated-evidence claim began to run when the criminal proceeding against him terminated in his favor, that is when he was acquitted at the end of his second trial, and not when the evidence was used against him.” U. S. v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82 (1978), “A judgment of an acquittal, whether based on jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict may not be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by reversal.” U. S. v. Wilson, 420 U. S. 332, 95 S. Ct. 1013 (1975), “Constitutional protection against government appeals attaches only where there is a danger of subjecting the defendant to a second trial for the same offence. Provision of the Criminal Appeals at of 1907 that government could not have a writ of error in any case where there had been a verdict in favor of the defendant was to assure that the statute would not conflict with the principles of the double jeopardy clause.” Exparte Lange, 85 U. S. 163 (1873). “A second judgment of the same verdict is, under such circumstances, void for want of power, and it affords no authority to hold the party a prisoner, and he must be discharged”. .” Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U. S. 65 (1857), “Where the Court has no jurisdiction or disregards rules of procedure for its exercise, all parties to illegal trials and imprisonment are trespassers on party aggrieved thereby, and he may recover in proper suit in civil courts.” Elliott v. Peirsol’s Lessee, 26 U. S. 328), “A judgment rendered by a court which does not have jurisdiction constitutes no jurisdiction and persons concern in executing such judgment are considered in law trespassers. If the court acts without authority, it's judgements and orders are regarded as nullities, and form no bar to recovery, even prior to reversal.”

Petitioner has also provided The United States District Court of South Carolina, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit with proof that he was never indicted for the crimes for the crimes for which he is falsely imprisoned, which also invalidates his conviction and shows that the South Carolina Department of Corrections has not legal or jurisdictional authority to hold him in prison. See Exparte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417 (1885).

Petitioner contends that the claims of false imprisonment, and other constitutional violations raised in this civil action were also raised in his 28 U.S.C.A. ₴ 2254 Petition for Habeas Corpus. See Terron Dizzley v. Warden Stephon, C/A No. 8:20 – CV-00126 – SAL; See also: Appeal to Fourth Circuit United States Court of Appeals, Case No. 21- 6329.

Although, it is clearly established that The United States Supreme Court laws have determined that when a person is confined illegally, in contrary of the Constitution or fundamental law, habeas corpus is the proper remedy regardless of exhaustion of state remedies, even though imposed pursuant to conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973), “Essence of “Habeas Corpus” is attacked by person in custody upon legality of that custody, and traditional function of the writ is to secure immediate relief from illegal custody. Requiring exhaustion before allowing state prisoners access to federal courts to attack validity of fact or length of their confinement means that prisoner’s state remedy must be adequate and available. The original view of habeas corpus attack upon detention under a judicial order “ was” a limited one. The relevant inquiry “ was” confined to determining simply whether or not the committing court had possessed jurisdiction. Eg., Exparte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38 (1822); Exparte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193 (1830). But, over the years, the writ of habeas evolved as a remedy available to effect discharge from any confinement contrary to the Constitution or fundamental law, even though imposed pursuant to conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction. See: Exparte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874); Exparte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1880); Exparte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417 (1885); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938); and Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942). See also. Fay v. Noia, Supra, at 405 – 409 of 372 U. S., 83 S. Ct. at 830 – 832 and cited at 409 n. 17, 83 S. Ct. at 832. Exparte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 (1886).”

Petitioner contends that also he provided the District Court with a copy of his 2012 Transcript which proves that he was acquitted of the charges for which he is incarcerated, therefore, he is falsely imprisoned in violation of The Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. The District Court intentionally made an erroneous ruling dismissing Petitioner’s Habeas Corpus without prejudice for alleged failure to exhaust state remedies which is contrary to U. S. Supreme Court law. Preiser supra, 411 U. S. 475 (1973); Exparte Lange, 18 Wal63 (1874).

Petitioner also demonstrated the lower courts, for seven years, has deprived him of his Direct Appeal and PCR through fraudulent means by officers of the court. Thus intentionally impeding him from exhausting any state remedies. According to United States Supreme Court law, under such circumstances, Petitioner is not required to exhaust state remedies and has the right to seek habeas relief. See: Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).

Petitioner contends that the District Court intentional erroneous dismissal of his habeas corpus which rendered a ruling contrary to U.S. Supreme Court laws, made habeas remedy unavailable through no lack of diligence on Petitioner’s part, therefore, according to clearly established Supreme Court law, The Fourth Circuit, and other circuits, under these circumstances, Petitioner is not barred by Heck from pursuing a ₴ 1983 Claim addressing his unlawful confinement. Spencer v. Kemma, 523 U. S. 1 (1998); Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F. 3d 262, 266 – 68 (4th Cir. 2008); Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F. 3d 1311 (2010), “If a Petitioner is unable to obtain habeas relief – at least where this inability is not due to Petitioner’s own lack of diligence – it would be unjust to place his claim for relief beyond the scope of ₴ 1983.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 (1990).

Petitioner contends that although it is clearly established by the United States Supreme Court law that I was acquitted of the charges of which I am falsely imprisoned, and that my malicious prosecution claim is not barred by Heck. On August 7, 2020, District Court, Magistrate Judge, Jacquelyn D. Austin, issued an order which was intentionally erroneous and contrary to United States Supreme law that his civil action for malicious prosecution was barred by Heck v. Humphry, although his acquittal in his 2012 first trial invalidates his unlawful conviction. On March 24, 2021, Judge Sherri A. Lydon adopted Judge Austin’s order without ruling on my objections nor my 59 (e) motion to correct the record and request that the courts break down Judge Baxley’s ruling according to clearly established federal law as what is defined as a “judgment of acquittal “ for purposes of double jeopardy.

Petitioner contends that he appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and Judge Gregory, Judge Agee and Shedd denied my appeal without ruling on the merits of my appeal.

Petitioner contends that false imprisonment is a crime, and The State of South Carolina has been intentionally holding him kidnapped, against his will, for almost eight years, and counting, without due process. Petitioner contends that Heck v. Humphry does not require him to wait until defendants stop committing criminal acts against him and release him from his false imprisonment before filing a civil action. Heck only requires that a person demonstrate that they received a judgment in their favor that would necessarily imply that the prior conviction or sentence was invalidated. Therefore, according to clearly established United States Supreme Court law, my acquittal in my first trial of 2012, establishes that my second trial of 2014 and conviction was without jurisdiction, and, therefore, invalid., and damages can be recovered despite the State of South Carolina criminal acts of holding me in prison unlawfully.

Petitioner contends that it is clearly established from the record that The District Court, and The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit theory is that; if the courts unlawfully refuse to make habeas relief available to him, and makes erroneous rulings contrary to the law such as an “acquittal” is not a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution to file a ₴ 1983 Civil Action, and The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s refusal to rule on the merits of the appeal that the courts can continue to unlawfully confine Petitioner, and kidnap him, to cover up the criminal acts of defendants in this case, so that defendants can escape liability. Petitioner contends that such unlawful actions of The District Court of South Carolina and The United States Court of Appeals amounts to a “usurpation of judicial power” and criminal acts of willful blindness to false imprisonment, obstruction of justice and conspiracy to violate civil rights in violation of 18 U.S.C A. ₴ 241, “Conspiracy Against Rights, ₴ 242, “Deprivations of Rights Under Color of Law; 42 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1985, “Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights; 42 U.S.C.A. ₴ 1986, “Actions for Neglect to Prevent, ₴ 1988, “Proceedings and Vindication of Civil Rights”. See: U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); U.S. v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); U.S. v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997); U.S. v. Moore, 708 F. 3d 639

ARGUMENT 18

RACKETEER, INFLUENCED, CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT (RICO)

Petitioner has demonstrated that the government officials in this petition has committed and conspired in committing federal and state crimes against him, thus, investing in, having control of, and conducted the affairs of having him kidnapped falsely imprisoned for over eight years and counting in the South Carolina Department of Corrections without any legal nor jurisdictional authority which is an “enterprise” for Rico purposes. Petitioner has also proved a pattern of racketeering activity not only pursuant to being kidnapped /falsely imprisoned for over 8 years and counting by these government officials in this petition, but, these government officials have also deliberately prevented Petitioner from having a direct appeal, PCR, or any appeal to obtain relief from his illegal conviction and false imprisonment and has committed fraud upon the court to keep petitioner illegally incarcerated in an attempt to cover up their illegal actions by keeping him away from the courts and deliberately failing file any of Petitioner’s motions for relief and refusing to adjudicate any of his cases. See: Boyle v. U.S., 556 U.S. 938 (2009), “An “enterprise,” as required to establish Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation, includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact, and Rico reaches a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging a course of conduct.” U.S. v. John Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186 (2014 3rd.Cir.), ”Defendants were convicted of Rico conspiracy and related offenses stemming from defendants alleged extortion, kidnapping, bribes, and drug trafficking while each served as law enforcement officers. Law enforcement officers are subjected to prosecution under criminal statues when they act unlawfully or without legal authority.” Bridge v.Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co.,553 U.S. 639 (2008); Salinas v. U.S., 522 U.S .52 (1997). Petitioner contends that before he was kidnapped and falsely imprisoned, he was working as a barber at Margrett's Hair Center at 280 Tyler Rd. in Orangeburg S.C. for the owner Margrett Harrison, who had retired and had given Petitioner an opportunity to own his own business in barbering, ,Petitioner contends that such lost of employment and business opportunity caused by his false imprisonment was an injury within the meaning or Rico. Dias v. Gates , 420 F.3d 897 (2005) “A false imprisonment that caused the victim to lose employment and employment opportunities was an injury to a business or property within the meaning of Rico.”

For the foregoing reasons, in the interest of liberty and justice, Petitioner must be immediately released from being kidnapped, falsely imprisoned for eight years and counting by The South Carolina Department of Corrections and The State of South Carolina.